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Why are some persons more materialistic than others? Consumer
materialism researchers, Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 307), found some believe
strongly “possession of things is the ultimate source of happiness” in life, leading
to a “lifestyle” that makes a “religion. . .of things.” Browne and Kaldenberg (1997,
p. 32) described the underlying causes of materialism as “a cluster of related traits,
attitudes, and values focusing on possessions and guiding” consumer behavior.
One observer wrote “other cultures sometimes see” Americans “as obsessively
materialistic or devoid of spiritual values” (Kleespie, 2002, p. 1). Researcher
Shalom Schwartz (1994, p. 21), described human values as “desirable. . .goals. . .that
serve as guiding principles in the life of a person.” Can individual values
orientations help to explain and predict levels of materialism in each consumer?
Building on the materialism research of Russell Belk (1985), Richins and
Dawson (1992) developed a survey instrument, the Richins and Dawson
Materialism Survey (RDMS), widely used to measure consumer materialism.
Schwartz built on earlier values investigation by Milton Rokeach (1973), to
develop the Schwartz (1992; 1994) Values Survey (SVS) to measure individual
preferences in values found in most human cultures (Schwartz, et al, 2001).
Schwartz (1992; 1994) identified ten value types defined by 57 individual
values. The value types, and individual values, can be visualized arrayed around a
pie-shaped two-dimensional space, with adjoining values and types being related
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and somewhat compatible. The value types on opposite sides of the pie may cause
some conflict or ambivalence in an individual’s goals, attitudes, or behaviors. The
ten value types make up four value groups identified as self-enhancement opposite
self-transcendence and conservation opposite openness to change.
It is hypothesized there is a cluster of materialism related values within and
near the self-enhancement group, comprised of the power, achievement, and
hedonism types. Conversely, it is hypothesized there is an opposing values cluster,
primarily within the self-transcendence group, comprised of the universalism,
tradition, and benevolence types, that is negatively associated with materialism.
Statistical analyses, of survey results taken from a sample of 97 American
adults, provide some evidence of the existence of a materialistic values cluster.
However, evidence of an opposing cluster of non-materialistic values is much less
convincing. There is some indication, although not statistically significant, that the
self-transcendence group of values has a negative correlation with materialistic
attitudes and behavior, but among the 57 individual values only social justice, 3
universalism value, is significantly and negatively correlated with materialism.
It appears when individuals cherish a large cluster of values, within the
power, hedonism, stimulation, and achievement value types that set of priorities
may contribute significantly to materialistic attitudes and behaviors. However,
persons who place more importance with the opposing values among the
benevolence and universalism value types may not necessarily display non-
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The Question: A Link Between Materialism and Values?
Human values researcher, Shalom Schwartz ( 1994, p. 21) defined values as
“desirable. . . goals. . .that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person.”
Consumer materialism researchers, Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 307), found that
some persons believe “possession of things is the ultimate source of happiness,”
causing them to create a “religion. . .of things,” to the degree that materialism
becomes a dominant “lifestyle.” Browne and Kaldenberg (1997, p. 32) described
materialism as “a cluster of related traits, attitudes, and values focusing on
possessions and guiding” consumer behavior. Is there a particular values
orientation, or a pattern or cluster of individual values or value types, closely
associated with the materialistic behavior and attitudes of some consumers?
Materialism has long been connected with values. It is, in fact, defined as a
values orientation—the belief that “worldly possessions constitute the greatest good
and highest value in life” (Morris, 1981, p. 806). The major theological traditions
treat materialism as an issue of human virtue, or in modern terms, a values
orientation. Confucianism maintains that what the “superior man seeks is in
himself. . .(but) what the inferior man seeks is without” (Van Voorst, R., 2000, p.
150). Judaism describes materiality as “vanity and striving after wind. . .what does
it accomplish?” (Van Voorst, R., 2000, p. 232). And Christianity teaches converts
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“do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth. . .for where your treasure is, there
your heart will be also” (Van Voorst, R., 2000, p. 274).
Popular literature, especially in America, has also taken note of materialistic
values. Writing about early twentieth century America, T.J. Jackson Lears (1983,
p. 3), perceived a “new set of values” associated with a wave of “compulsive
spending.” Novelist Sherwood Anderson (1919, p. 42) described changing
American “standards” associated with what he portrayed as the beginning of “the
most materialistic age in the history of the world.” In the 1920’s, Robert S. Lynd’s
extensive Middletown research unearthed new, materialistic values that were
displacing “old-fashioned values” (Lears, 1983, p. 130). Commenting on modern
marketing techniques, one recent observer wrote “other cultures sometimes see us
as obsessively materialistic or devoid of spiritual values” (Kleespie, 2002, p. 1).
By the 1950’s, academic researchers had developed an interest in the
American consumers’ ever increasing desire for material goods and how that
behavior might relate to values (Heilbroner, 1956; Allport, 1961). Russell Belk
(1985) developed the first widely used instrument to measure materialism. He
believed materialistic attitudes and behavior to be irreconcilable with spiritual or
traditional values (Belk, 1985). Easterlin and Crimmins (1991, p. 499) cited
changing “value orientations” as the primary factor in a societal shift toward
materialistic pursuits and away from other life goals. Richins and Dawson (1992)
designed and tested a materialism survey that has gained wide acceptance.
Although other researchers have disagreed, they saw “materialism (itself) as a
value” (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p. 308; Holt, 1995).
Schneider (1917, p. 151) was the first to propose “establishing and relating
types of values” when he identified six possible values categories. The Rokeach
(1973) values survey eventually became the most widely used scale to measure
human values orientations. Although the Rokeach (1973) instrument is still
extensively utilized, Schwartz (1992; 1994), with an expanded values list,
demonstrated considerable success in identifying a universal, cross-cultural, human
values structure. The Schwartz (1994) values survey (SVS) instructs subjects to
rank/rate 57 individual values found to be segmented into ten distinct value types.
Values are conceived, in practice, to be treated cognitively as worthy, competing,
but not necessarily exclusive, objectives. There is never an absence of values, but
we “merely elevate (some) ways of behaving. . .in importance relative” to others
(Mayton, Ball-Rokeach, and Loges, 1994, p. 3). The values, and value types,
identified by Schwartz (1994), are arrayed in two-dimensional space defined by
similarity structure analysis (SSA) statistical techniques.
The two-dimensional structure of the ten identified value types (Figure 1) is
explained by the dynamic interrelationships among them (Schwartz, et al, 2001).
The pursuit of goals associated with any value type “may conflict or may be
congruent with the pursuit of” goals associated with other value types (Schwartz et
al, 2001, p. 521). For example, the pursuit of goals consistent with the benevolence
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Figure 1: Theoretical model of relationships among human values.
conflict with contemporaneous efforts to achieve goals linked with the spatially
opposed power, achievement, and hedonism value types, which are collectively
labeled as the self-enhancement values. Conversely, goals and attitudes associated
with values that are located in adjoining space in the circular pattern will generally
be congruent or compatible with each other. For example, benevolence goals are
likely not to conflict with universalism or tradition values and power-related values
and the ends associated with them are likely not to conflict with achievement
values.
Values Associated With Materialism
Many of the individual values, identified by Schwartz (1994) and others,
have been associated with materialism. Anderson (1919, p. 43) described a
“materialistic age” as a period when people’s minds are “fixed upon fortunes to be
made.” Two of the related Schwartz (1994) values are wealth and ambition.
Materialistic persons are known to be obsessed with their “success” as
demonstrated by the “number and quality of possessions accumulated” (Richins
and Dawson, 1992, p. 331). Success is another individual value identified by
Schwartz (1994). Materialistic persons demonstrate an inordinate concern for the
ways that purchased goods can contribute to an enhanced image (Campbell, 1987;
Richins and Dawson, 1992). Social recognition and preserving public image may
be values related to materialism that have been identified by Schwartz (1994).
Values Associated with Non-Materialism
Other specific values have either been associated with persons who are non-
materialistic, or identified as goals and objectives that are not of great importance
to materialistic persons. Heilbroner (1956) believed materialism crowded out
other, more selfless, pursuits. Those selfless goals may embody one of the higher-
order classifications of values, identified by Schwartz (1994), as self-
transcendence. Belk ( 1985) supposed that materialism is inconsistent with spiritual
or traditional values. One of Schwartz’ (1994) value types is labeled tradition
values, and several of the individual values (spiritual life, devout, and forgiving),
located in the same two-dimensional region, are identified with a possible eleventh
value type denoted as spirituality. Some non-materialistic persons have embraced a
life-style of “voluntary simplicity,” which involves “low consumption, ecological
responsibility, and self-sufficiency” (Shama and Wisenblit, 1984, p. 231). Some of
the individual values in the universal type, identified by Schwartz (1994), include
protecting the environment, responsible, and unity with nature.
Hypotheses Related to Materialistic Values
It appears there may be a cluster of specific and related values, among the
power, achievement, and hedonism types, and observable within the two-
dimensional values structure defined by Schwartz (1994), that are commonly
associated with materialistic attitudes and behavior. Conversely, there also appears
there may be a competing or conflicting values cluster, among the Schwartz (1994)
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value types of tradition, benevolence, and universalism, of certain interrelated
values that are frequently linked with non-materialistic attitudes and behavior.
Belk, Dholakia, and Venkatesh (1996, p. 219) concluded various “people
and cultures (hold) different combinations of material and nonmaterial values.”
Many of the values associated with materialistic behavior (Figure 2) are either
directly identified, or are synonymous, with those that are clustered within the self-
enhancement grouping, or the power, achievement, and hedonism value types,
identified by Schwartz (1994). de Tocqueville (1965, p. 83) believed early
nineteenth century Americans were notable by the pursuit of “their own welfare,”
the very definition of self-enhancement. Sherwood Anderson (1919, p. 43) saw the
“materialistic age” of the early twentieth century as a period when “mind(s)” were
“fixed upon fortunes to be made.” Two of the defining self-enhancement values
are ambition and wealth.
A survey conducted in the 1950’s (Bredemeier and Toby, 1963, p. 72)
found Americans reported their “most serious” goal in life was “trying to live as
comfortably. . .as possible,” an objective that might be equated to the achievement
value of success and the hedonism values of pleasure and enjoying life. Du Bois
(1955) and Weber (1958) had also noted the degree to which materialistic persons
seem to equate the number and quality of material possessions with success in life.
In another connection with the value of success, Richins and Dawson (1992, p.
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Figure 2: Hypothesis 1A ~ Cluster of values positively related to materialism.
number and quality of possessions accumulated.” Concern for achievement,
among materialists, is so strong they “consider material well-being as evidence of
success” (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p. 304). Materialists are likely to “view their
possessions as indicators of . . .success in life” (Richins and Rudman, 1994, p. 223).
Although findings are not consistent, some have found that materialistic persons
“can be expected to work more or strive for higher paying jobs” compared to
persons with other values (Richins and Rudman, 1994, p. 224; Sirgy, 1998). One
of the Schwartz (1994) achievement values is ambition.
Belk (1985, p. 268) developed an instrument to measure materialism, which
incorporated “envy” as one of its’ three primary constructs. Envy was defined as
“displeasure and ill will at the superiority of (another person) in happiness, success,
reputation, or the possession of anything desirable” (Belk, 1985, p. 268). Belk’s
(1985) envy construct appears to be closely related to the Schwartz (1994) power
and achievement values of success, ambition, social recognition, preserving public
image, and social power and the security value of sense of belonging. In the
American consumer culture, material possessions have assumed particular
importance in social comparison aimed to the determination of self worth (Belk,
1988; Dittmar, 1992). Cushman (1990), a social psychologist, joined cultural
historians, such as Lears (1983) and Susman (1973), in identifying materialism as a
phenomenon associated with individual, or self-enhancement, values. Materialism
has been found to be strongly associated with several personal achievement
motivations, such as ambition, influence, and success (Netemeyer, Burton, and
Lichtenstein, 1995).
Materialistic persons tend to develop an inordinate concern for the ways in
which purchased goods or experiences can contribute to an enhanced image, either
of themselves or their perceptions of others (Campbell, 1987; Richins and Dawson,
1992). Highly materialistic persons were found to value possessions for seeking
social status (Richins, 1994). Materialists therefore tend to see possessions as ends
in themselves and/or as means to enhance self-image or social standing (Holt,
1995). Self-monitoring is a measure of the extent to which people feel driven or
motivated to scrutinize their own appearance and behavior for social acceptability.
Two of the three materialism constructs found by Richins and Dawson (1992),
were determined to be closely related to self-monitoring behavior (Chatterjee and
Hunt, 1996). Browne and Kaldenberg (1997) also found significant correlations
between self-monitoring scores and materialism. Excessive concern for image and
self-monitoring behavior may be closely associated with the Schwartz (1994)
values of preserving public image, social recognition, and sense of belonging.
Bredemeier and Toby (1963, p. 434) reported that materialistic Americans
held a “vision that one more gadget, one more convenience, one more recent model
of something, will be the thing to make life pleasant and worthwhile.” That finding
may be closely related to the hedonism values of pleasure and enjoying life.
Dimma (1991, p. 8) linked materialism, hedonism, and the pursuit of wealth, as he
reported American consumers have become more inclined to “materialism,
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hedonism, and greed.” In an analysis that relates to the power type values of social
recognition, social power, and wealth, Ward and Wackman (1971, p. 426) describe
materialism as “an orientation emphasizing possessions and money for personal
happiness and social progress.”
Despite a wealth of both ancient and modern anecdotal evidence, and
fragmentary, or incomplete, quantitative substantiation, it appears no researcher has
yet examined possible relationships between consumer orientations for the entire
human values structure and those given to either materialistic or non-materialistic
attitudes and behavior.
Hypothesis 1A: Each of the 12 values within the materialistic value cluster
(Figure 2) comprised of sense of belonging, social power, authority, wealth,
preserving public image, social recognition, ambitious, successful, influential,
pleasure, self-indulgence, and enjoying life is positively associated with
materialistic attitudes and behavior.
Hypothesis 1B: Each of the three Schwartz (1994) value types (power,
achievement, and hedonism) that coincide closely with the cluster of 12
materialistic values is positively associated with materialistic attitudes and behavior
(Figure 2).
Hypothesis 1C: The higher-order values category of self-enhancement,
containing 11 of the 12 materialistic values, is positively associated with
materialism.
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Hypotheses Related to Non-Materialistic Values
French philosopher, de Tocqueville (1965, p. 110, p.68) also detected
among Americans at least “momentary outbreaks” when they were controlled by
the spiritual side of their natures and observed that “the great majority. . .were (not)
exclusively” engaged in material pursuits. Sherwood Anderson (1919, p. 43) saw
materialism as the opposing side of a coin where “men would forget God
and. . .moral standards, when the will to power would replace the will to serve.”
T.J. Jackson Lears’ (1983, p.3) Virginia Woolf observed “a new set of values” as
she declared that, “on or about December 1910, human character changed.” If
there was a new set of values or, more probably, a different values orientation, that
encouraged materialism, then there must have been an older values orientation that
did not—one that was focused on non-materialistic goals.
Fox (1983, p. 109) concluded the Americans of the 1920’s were “bothered
by their own emergent form of (materialistic) behavior” due to their conflicted
recollections of their earlier “alternative value system.” Heilbroner (1956)
concluded the quest for material goods tends to crowd out other, more selfless,
pursuits. Bredemeier and Toby (1963) believed materialism could drive out other,
competing, values and lead one to a state of religious and political apathy.
Bengston and Lovejoy (1973) envisioned the concepts of humanism and
materialism as opposing bipolar ends of a single factor value system. Kasser and
Ryan (1993) concluded that if there are ranked categories or domains of values and
that if materialism is a value or, is closely associated with certain values, then
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materialism may eventuate, in the individual value hierarchy, to lessen, or even
exclude altogether, other, opposing values.
Belk (1985) declared the major theological traditions have long rejected
materialism and generally held it to be irreconcilable with the spiritual or
traditional values. Cushman (1990) perceived materialists are torn by an internal
conflict between societal and individual values. The political and economic
interests of our form of democratic capitalism form social values that may oppose
more altruistic, or traditional, internal values (Cushman, 1990). Dimma (1991, p.
8) proposed that the “spiritual values” were losing sway with materialistic
Americans.
The values that oppose materialistic attitudes and behavior may be within
the tradition, conformity, benevolence, and universalism value types (Schwartz,
1994). Schwartz (1994) reported sporadic identification of a spirituality value type
that includes values such as spiritual life, devoutness, forgiving, and detachment
that normally are within the tradition and benevolence value type segments.
Whitcraft (1989, p. 192) believed that despite the “genetic predisposition of
humans to make altruistic decisions,” that the consumer culture of the 1980’s was
causing Americans to become addicted to “self-indulgent materialism.” Altruistic
values may coincide with Schwartz’ (1984) higher-order self-transcendence
grouping, which includes the benevolence and universalism value types.
Shama and Widenblit (1984, p. 231) examined the non-materialistic values
of the “voluntary simplicity” lifestyle. They describe voluntary simplicity (perhaps
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a near opposite of materialism) as a way of life involving “low consumption,
ecological responsibility and self-sufficiency” (Shama and Wisenblit, 1984, p.
231). That orientation may be closely related to the Schwartz (1994) values of
protecting environment, unity with nature, responsible, accepting portion in life,
self-discipline, and moderation.
Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 331) conclude that it is “the pursuit of
happiness through acquisition” to the exclusion of “other means (such as personal
relationships, experiences, or achievements) that distinguishes materialism.” If
materialists tend to under-value personal relationships, then they may be less
inclined toward the values of true friendship, loyal, helpful, forgiving, and mature
love. Fox and Lears (1983, p. x) described America’s nineteenth century “producer
ethic,” that gave way to consumer materialism, as a “value system based on work,
sacrifice, and saving.” Those non-materialistic attributes may coincide with the
Schwartz (1994) values of self-discipline, responsible, acceptance of portion in life,
social justice, and moderation. Persons, who are not particularly materialistic, tend
not to gauge self-image by their possessions and will therefore be predisposed to be
more content with their current standard of living (Richins, 1995). Non-
materialists may place value in spiritual or intellectual experiences and in other
persons (Holt, 1995). Those spiritual and intellectual values could include inner
harmony, social justice, and wisdom.
Materialism has been associated with greed, covetousness, and lack of
charitability (Browne and Kaldenberg, 1997). Those traits may oppose the values
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of helpfulness, responsibility, humility, social justice, and forgivingness. It has
been reported that those who are low in religiosity are more likely to be
materialistic and suggested that “marketers might benefit from considering
consumer religiosity as a segmentation” variable (La Barbera, 1997, p. 92). If
religiosity describes a value cluster that is opposite the material values, it may be
closely associated with the spirituality values included within the tradition,
benevolence, and universalism value types described by Schwartz (1994). It has
been observed that materialistic persons may display the negative emotions or traits
of “envy, jealousy, feelings of inequity,” and even “anger” (Sirgy, 1998, p. 229). If
feelings of inequality and anger characterize the materialistic, then the values of
equality, world peace, inner harmony, and social justice may typify those who are
not materialistic.
Muncy and Eastman (1998, p. 141) found a “strong and consistent
(negative) relationship between all of the dimensions of the materialism scale
(Richins and Dawson, 1992) and all of the dimensions” of a consumer ethics scale.
If ethical behavior is negatively associated with materialism, then many of the
virtues (honesty, loyalty, responsibility, helpfulness, forgivingness, humility,
moderation, respect for tradition, devoutness, social justice, environmental
protection, wisdom, equality, and broadmindedness) found among the value types
of tradition, benevolence, and universalism may also be negatively related to
materialism. Some have also found religiosity to be positively related to higher
standards of ethics (Du Bois, 1955; Belk, 1985, Foumier and Richins, 1991; La
15
Barbera and Gurhan, 1997). Religiosity and higher ethical standards are closely
associated, and each of them may be negatively related to materialism (Flouri,
1999). The values associated with each non-materialistic construct, ethics and
religiosity, are co-mingled within the tradition, benevolence, and universalism
types.
Materialists have been found to be significantly “more neurotic and less
extraverted, open, agreeable, and conscientious” than those with low materialism
scores (Sharpe and Ramanaiah, 1999, p. 329). Less materialistic persons, who are
more conscientious, may also value self-discipline and responsibility. Those who
are more open may also hold to the values of broadmindedness, equality, and true
friendship. Those who are more agreeable, may be more humble, moderate,
accepting, and respectful for tradition. Post-materialism, or non-materialism, has
been related to values such as the life “goals like democracy, love, or intellectual
satisfaction” (Clark, 2000, p. 47). Those who are less materialistic could, therefore,
hold wisdom, mature love, and equality to be higher values.
Hypothesis 2A: Each of the 24 values within the non-materialistic value
cluster (Figure 3), comprised of acceptance of portion in life, moderation,
devoutness, respect for tradition, humility, self-discipline, loyalty, responsibility,
true friendship, meaning in life, honesty, spirituality, forgivingness, helpfulness,
mature love, wisdom, world peace, social justice, inner harmony, world beauty,
environmental protection, unity with nature, equality, and broadmindedness, is
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Figure 3: Hypothesis 2A ~ Cluster of values negatively related to materialism.
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Hypothesis 2B: Each of the three value types (tradition, benevolence, and
universalism) that coincide closely with the cluster of 25 non-materialistic values is
negatively associated with materialistic attitudes and behavior (Figure 3).
Hypothesis 2C: The higher-order value category of self-transcendence
(containing 18 of the 25 non-materialistic values) is negatively associated with
materialistic attitudes and behavior (Figure 3).
Organization of the Study
Despite the long observed anecdotal evidence and more recent fragmentary
empirical proof, it appears no researcher has yet examined possible relationships
between consumer prioritizations of the entire system of human values and the
behaviors and attitudes of those persons prone to materiali’sm.
It is proposed that the Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism survey
(RDMS) and the Schwartz (1994) value survey (SVS) be combined within a
written questionnaire that also seeks basic demographic information. It is proposed
that the resulting survey will be administered to a diverse sample of adult American
consumers for the purpose of determining whether personal values orientations to
two opposing clusters of values, one described as materialistic and one as non-
materialistic, are related to the consumers levels of materialism.
Data gathered from the written survey sample will be analyzed utilizing
statistical correlation and regression in search of supporting evidence related to the
hypotheses concerning two possibly opposing or conflicting clusters of associated
18
values that may be related, either positively or negatively, to materialistic attitudes
and behavior.
Summary of Chapter I
Is there a definable link between an individual’s human values orientation
or priorities and whether that person displays materialistic or non-materialistic
attitudes and behaviors? A review of the literature seems to indicate there may be
such a link and provides some clues as to which value priorities may be related to
materialistic tendencies and which may be linked to non-materialistic inclinations.
It is therefore hypothesized that a cluster of power, achievement, and hedonism
type values are related to materialism and a competing cluster of benevolence,
universalism, and tradition values are related to non-materialism. Previously
developed and widely used instruments designed to measure both values






There is a wealth of literature dealing with both materialism and with
human values beginning with classical secular literature from the Greek and Roman
cultures and also from the writings of each of the major theological traditions.
Both have also been common themes within the popular literature of every major
culture. Modern academic inquiry into both concepts dates from the late nineteenth
century or early twentieth century with a wealth of research beginning by the
middle of the twentieth century. While, there has been considerable investigation
into each concept, materialism and human values, until this time there has been
little or no research into the commonly assumed, and often mentioned, links
between them.
Materialism Defined
One dictionary defines materialism as a “devotion to material needs and
desires, to the neglect of spiritual matters: a way of life, opinion, or tendency based
entirely upon material interests” (Simpson and Weiner, 1989, p. 743). Still another
characterizes materialism as a “preoccupation with or emphasis on material objects,
comforts, and considerations, as opposed to spiritual or intellectual values”
(Costello, 1996, p. 836). A third dictionary similarly describes materialism as a
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“tendency to prefer material possessions. . .to spiritual values” (Abate, 1999, p.
812). In each case a theory or doctrine identifies material possessions as a high or
even the highest value or concern in life and the attitudes or behaviors associated
with that doctrine are described as materialism. It should also be noted that either
by inference, or directly, the formal definitions include the notion that materialistic
behavior includes some sort of values tradeoff — “preoccupation with. . .material
objects. . .as opposed to spiritual or intellectual values” (Costello, 1996, p. 836).
Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 307) found that materialistic consumers
believe “possession of things is the ultimate source of happiness,” and they create a
“religion out of things,” so that materialism becomes a dominant “lifestyle” (Belk,
1984; Bredemeier and Toby, 1960; Daune, 1983). Holt (1995, p.12) described
materialism as either a “trait or value that measures the importance of possessions
in one’s life.” Browne and Kaldenberg (1997, p. 32) described materialism as “a
cluster of related traits, attitudes, and values focusing on possessions and guiding
the selection of events and things.”
Origins of the Concept of Materialism
Aristotle took note of the “essential interrelation of. . .ethics and economics”
some 400 years B.C. (Seligman, 1901, p. 612). Although the term ‘materialism’ is
more recent, the concept of materialism dates from antiquity. Plato propounded the
notion that the desire for wealth and property is good only in moderation and that
human virtue is achieved through other goods (or values)——“for I do nothing but go
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about persuading you all, old and young alike, not to take thought for your persons
and your properties, but first and chiefly to care about the greatest improvement of
the soul. I tell you that virtue is not given by money. . .but. . .from. . .every other
good of man” (Bartleby.com, n.d.). Plato apparently thought little of “the lovers of
money,” those who loved the “things of the world in general,” and persons who are
“lovers of power and honor” (Bartleby.com, n.d.). The Roman social historian
Gaius Sallustius Crispus, in the first century BC, noted an apparent tradeoff
between material concerns and morality, when he observed “the glory that goes
with wealth is fleeting and fragile; (while) virtue is a possession glorious and
eternal” (Bartleby.com, n.d.). Pliny the Younger developed a “certain habitual
contempt for. . .the slavery. . .(to) money” and observed that “mankind seem to be
universally governed by an innate passion to accumulate wealth” (Bartleby.com,
n.d.). The Phyrgian Stoic philosopher, Epictetus, wrote principally of his lack of
concern for accumulated property and taught instead that true good or virtue is
found within oneself—“remember not (to) love. . .power and wealth. . .but learning,
it matters not what the outer thing may be. . (Bartelby.com, n.d.).
The ancient literature of many of the world’s primary theological traditions
echo similar ethical and moral concerns surrounding the undue preoccupation with
wealth and material goods. The following exhortation is from an early Hindu text,
“Those who are tranquil, wise and live on alms, depart free from passion. . .to where
the immortal Person dwells, whose nature is imperishable. Let (each) acquire
freedom from all desires. Nothing that is eternal can be gained by what is not
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eternal” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 39). Similar observations are excerpted from an
ancient Buddhist collection of moral wisdom, “Restraint is good in all things. Even
the gods will praise one who, though he receives little, does not despise what he has
received. He who lives looking for pleasures only, his senses uncontrolled,
immoderate in his desires, the tempter will certainly overthrow him” (Van Voorst,
2000, p. 89). “He who aims to be a man of virtue. . .does not seek always to gratify
his appetites, nor in his dwelling place does he seek the appliances of ease. What
the superior man seeks is in himself. What the inferior man seeks is (without)” is
found in early Confucian writings (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 149).
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, Solomon, the ancient Hebrew writer,
recounted his search to find meaning in life in all manner of material gain, “I built
houses for myself, I planted vineyards, I made gardens and parks. . .and planted in
them all kinds of fruit trees; I made ponds of water. . .from which to irrigate a forest
of growing tree. I possessed flocks and herds larger than all who preceded me in
Jerusalem. I collected for myself silver and gold” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 233).
Later in life, Solomon concluded of his materiality, “all was vanity and striving
after wind. . .it is madness. . .what does it accomplish" (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 233).
In the Christian writings of the first century AD, Paul cautioned that both ethical
fault and emotional heartache flowed from “the love of money. (It) is a root of all
sorts of evil, and some by longing for it have. . .pierced themselves with many
griefs” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 283). Christ himself advocated a life of voluntary
simplicity among his early disciples, “Don't take along any money, or a traveler's
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bag, or even an extra pair of sandals” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 258). One of the
chroniclers of Christ’s ministry wrote, "No one can serve two masters; for either he
will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to one and despise the
other. You cannot serve God and wealth” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 281). And finally,
the elder statesman of first-century Christianity, John, concluded, “Do not love the
world or anything in the world. The world and its desires pass away” (Van Voorst,
2000,p.284)
Materialism in Early American Society
Although the concept of materialism is both ancient and worldwide, the
modern manifestation of the phenomenon has reached its peak in the western
world, and specifically in the system of democratic capitalism of America (Novak,
1996). In 1840, de Tocqueville (1965, p. 43) observed, “the desire of acquiring the
good things of this world is the prevailing passion of the American people.” He
believed the people of America were more “bent upon the pursuit of material
objects” than any other society in history (de Tocqueville, 1965, p. 59). During his
tours of the new world, de Tocqueville (1965, p. 83) saw Americans “pursue their
own welfare with feverish ardor” and remarked “a native of the United States
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clings to this world’s goods as if he were certain never to die. And yet, despite
the unprecedented preoccupation with material wealth, de Tocqueville (1965, p.
110, p.68) also hopefully detected among nineteenth century Americans at least
“momentary outbreaks” when they were controlled by the spiritual side of their
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natures and he could not bring himself to foresee a future where “the great majority
of mankind were exclusively” engaged in material pursuits. Americans were
perceived to be free to pursue, and to some extent balanced by, other more spiritual,
intellectual, or social gratifications.
America’s new capitalistic democracy gave the common man choices, more
choices than ever before, to pursue happiness through whatever means he elected.
While the phenomenon of materialism, or excessive valuing of wealth and material
goods, was as old as society, the period from the late eighteenth through the
nineteenth century in America saw an unprecedented expansion of the materialistic
trend. By the time of the American Revolution, significant numbers of families
purchased goods resulting from the inception of early mass production and
commercial marketing efforts (Bauman, 1998; Horowitz, 1985). Laboring class
households gained access to a wide range of commodities and, for perhaps the first
time, sought household comforts and conveniences from an expanding
marketplace. Commercially produced furniture and other household goods began
to change domestic life (Horowitz, 1985). Horowitz (1985, p. xxv) believed the
late eighteenth century became such a “convulsion of getting and spending, such an
eruption of new prosperity, and such an explosion of new production and marketing
techniques, that a greater proportion of the population than in any previous society
in human history was able to enjoy the pleasures of buying consumer goods."
The pace of material consumption quickened at about the time de
Tocqueville visited America. One historian noted that the demand for middle class
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consumer goods expanded considerably between 1830 and the Civil War period
(Horowitz, 1985). But despite the birth, and growth spurt, of a consumer society in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, most Americans still lived an
extremely modest existence by today’s standards. Nearly all, early nineteenth
century Americans spent the vast majority of their income on the basic necessities
of life, food, clothing, and shelter. However, in the period after the Civil War up
until the World War I, a true shift from a producer economy to a consumer
economy took shape (Bauman, 1998). The industrialization of America brought a
regular factory or office workweek along with a regular paycheck. The
combination of more leisure time and more disposable income for consumers,
together with a quickly expanding array of manufactured consumer goods, brought
unprecedented change (Bauman, 1998; Horowitz, 1985).
Materialism in Twentieth Century America
Sherwood Anderson (1919), in the popular fiction of the early twentieth
century, composed a frighteningly powerful image of society’s heightening
apprehensions about the rapidly unfolding, uniquely American, onslaught of
pandemic materialism.
...Jesse hungered for. . .something else. He had grown into maturity in
America in the years after the Civil War and he, like all men of his time,
had been touched by the deep influences that were at work in the country
during those years when modern industrialism was being born. Faintly he
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realized that the atmosphere of old times and places that he had always
cultivated in his own mind was strange and foreign to the thing that was
growing up in the minds of others. The beginning of the most materialistic
age in the history of the world. . .without patriotism, when men would forget
God and. . .moral standards, when the will to power would replace the will
to serve and beauty would be well-nigh forgotten in the terrible headlong
rush of mankind toward the acquiring of possessions, was telling its story to
Jesse. . .as it was to the men about him. The greedy thing in him wanted to
make money faster than it could be made by tilling the land. His eyes shone
(as he said), “I am thinking about it all the time. Big things are going to be
done in the country and there will be more money to be made than I ever
dreamed of.” Later. . .when night came on and the stars came out it was
harder to get back the old feeling— Jesse’s mind was fixed
upon. . .things. . .and. . .on fortunes to be made almost without any effort...
(Anderson, 1919, p. 42-43).
T.J. Jackson Lears (1983, p.3) writes there is a grain of truth to Virginia
Woolf’s declaration that, “on or about December 1910, human character changed.”
He notes that around the turn of the century a “new set of values” built on a wave
of “compulsive spending” replaced an old ethos that had in the alternative valued
the Victorian mores of “perpetual work, compulsive saving, civic responsibility,
and. . .self denial” (Lears, 1983, p. 3). Changing economic conditions made more
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goods available to more people prompting a shift in the ancient quest for life’s’
meaning from the spiritual realm to the material realm.
By the 1920’s, the transition from a producer society to an American
consumer society was unquestionably well underway (Bauman, 1985; Fox, 1983;
Horowitz, 1985). The groundbreaking social analysis of Middletown, by Robert S.
Lynd, led Fox (1983, p. 109) to conclude the citizens of Muncie, Indiana of the
1920’s were “bothered by their own emergent form of (materialistic) behavior” due
to their conflicted recollections of an earlier “alternative value system.” Fox (1983,
p. 120) finds Lynd “never gave up his distaste for the consumer culture (where)
old-fashioned values” were replaced by the more materialistic ones of the twentieth
century.
Even the wrenching economic disruption of the ‘Great Depression’ era of
the 1930’s did little, apparently, to impact the growing materialistic tendencies of
many Americans. Horowitz (1985, p. 135) cites a federal study of the Great
Depression to confirm that many families only modestly and temporarily “modified
patterns of expenditures so that they could continue to live as they had in more
prosperous times.” Horowitz (1985, p. 150) observed that, by 1940, Americans
were manifestly seeking meaning and “happiness through commercial goods and
experiences.” Some cynical observers even saw the beginning of American
involvement in World War H as a draconian path to bring re-commitment of the
country to the older, less materialistic, values (Horowitz, 1985). The early post-
World War H period brought American “consumer society” into full bloom
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(Bauman, 1998). By 1950, many Americans had fully evolved, or perhaps
regressed, into materialistic consumers, “impatient, impetuous, and restive,” in
their quest for the good life (Bauman, 1998, p. 25).
Materialism Research in the Modern Era
Seligman’s (1901) treatise on the relationships between man’s economic
and ethical concerns is one of the early formulations, dealing with doctrinal or
historical materialism, in modern academic literature. There was very little
published inquiry on materialism prior to mid-century that was other than
philosophical and or observational in nature (Isaacs, 1935; Davis and Moore,
1945). The academy made no significant effort to define, or empirically measure,
either on an individual or societal basis, the specific attitudes and behaviors of
materialistic consumers until the latter half of the century. However, the
phenomenon of materialism was in full flourish in America by the 1950’s
(Bauman, 1998; Wilson, 1993).
Heilbroner (1956, p. 239) evaluated both the positive and negative effects of
materialism and described consumer behavior as a “gradual (economic) continuum
shading from the disfiguration of the personality under grinding poverty to its
disfiguration in opulence.” He presumed there must be some “optimal point along
that line where wealth and possessions could be enjoyed without being abused”
(Heilbroner, 1956, 'p. 239). Why is more not always better? Because, Heilbroner
(1956) concluded, the quest for material goods tends to crowd out other, more
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selfless, pursuits and eventually poses a grave psychological threat to the
individual.
A survey, conducted in the 1950’s (Bredemeier and Toby, 1963, p. 72),
found about eighty percent of Americans reported their “most serious” goal in life
was “trying to live as comfortably. . .as possible.” Bredemeier and Toby (1963, p.
77) portrayed fully developed American materialism as something akin to an
idolatrous religion or “the worship of things.” It was proposed that materialism
could drive out other, competing, values and lead a person to a state of religious
and political apathy. Bredemeier and Toby (1963, p. 434) defined modern,
American materialism as “the vision that one more gadget, one more convenience,
one more recent model of something, will be the thing to make life pleasant and
worthwhile.”
A stream of non—empirical or anecdotal materialism literature continued into
the 1980’s. Uusitalo (1983) observed the escalation of materialistic consumption
patterns in Western industrial society. Materialism was thought to be a generally
futile quest for meaning or purpose in life. Uusitalo (1983, p. 8) did contend,
however, that for some persons “high individual material consumption. . .seems to
be a way of giving some aim or direction to (their) everyday lives.” He also
recognized a connection between values and materialism when he alluded to the
“values of materialism” (Uusitalo, 1983, p. 15). Mukerji (1983, p. 8) believed
modern Western society underwent a value shift that “loosed material concerns
from other constraints, producing the first truly materialistic culture.” Capitalism
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and materialism are inextricably linked through materialistic roots that pre-date the
industrial revolution.
Wachtel (1983, p. 2) also supposed materialism is a wasted search for
meaning when he warned that so long as society persists in “defining well-being
predominantly in economic terms. . .(and as) our primary frame of reference for
personal and societal policy decisions, we will remain unsatisfied.” Following the
persistent need for things, in a search for happiness, will inevitably lead to
disappointment. Wachtel (1983) saw a correlation between encroaching
materialism and a values shift away from more altruistic concerns. He maintained
“the idea of more, of ever increasing wealth, has become the center of our identity
and our security, and we are as caught up by it as the addict is by his drugs”
(Wachtel, (1983, p. 71).
Early attempts at empirical investigation into the phenomenon of
materialism began in the 1950’s. The groundbreaking researchers endeavored to
measure materialism with broadly inferential techniques. Dickins and Ferguson
(1957) utilized questions about which particular toys or clothes children wish for
and what vocations they intend to seek as adults to form an approximate measure of
youthful materialism. Campbell (1969) formulated an early, but more precise,
attempt to measure attitudes related to materialism with an eight-item, forced
ranking format. Wackman, Reale, and Ward (1972) followed with a five-item,
Likert-scale rating instrument designed around attitudes toward the consequences
of the pursuit of money and possessions in a quest for happiness.
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Reverting to inferential methods, others investigated implied materialism by
utilizing various personality tests thought to measure materialism-related attributes
(Burdsal, 1975; Justice and Birkman, 1972). Bengston and Lovejoy (1973)
envisioned the concepts of humanism and materialism as opposing bipolar ends of
a single factor value system and constructed a measure that asked subjects to rank-
order sixteen individual values items. Other researchers developed a materialism-
related “acquisitiveness” survey composed of six items for subjects to rate
(Jackson, Ahmed, and Heapy, 1976). Moschis and Churchill (1978) followed with
a slightly expanded adaptation of the Wackman, Reale, and Ward (1972) survey,
which also focused on measuring youthful materialism.
Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1978), cognizant of the ancient
ethical or moral issues concerning materialism, proposed a dichotomous
materialism construct. They defined “instrumental materialism” as the ethically
harmless pursuit of wealth or objects to “further personal values and goals in life”
and proposed the existence of a “terminal” or ethically dangerous form of
materialism focused on possession itself Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton,
1978, p. 8). Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton’s (1978) concept of
instrumental and terminal materialism may have derived from a strikingly similar
concept in the values research. In any case, the notion was intuitively attractive.
Greed for possessions themselves is held to be innately immoral or unethical, while
desire to possess, for altruistic ends, is moral. While the work provoked added
interest in the topic, the notion of ethical and unethical forms of materialism has not
32
withstood the scrutiny of continued research (Belk, 1985; Richins and Dawson,
1992). In fact, although Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1978) described
terminal materialism as an end in itself, they also provided conflicting commentary
by noting that the desire to be envied or to achieve social status is the actual goal of
terminal materialism. In any case, it appears that the two-classification view of
materialism is contingent on subjective value judgments about the end purposes of
the consuming behavior.
Inglehart (1981) did considerable work with European samples that
focused, not on individual, but societal levels of doctrinal materialism versus post-
materialism. Responses were measured to twelve social goals designed to
differentiate persons with materialistic values from those with post-materialistic, or
more socially oriented, values. Although Inglehart (1981) contributed to the stream
of doctrinal materialism research, his work is not apparently useful as a direct
measure of individual materialistic consumer behavior and attitudes. Later
researchers questioned whether the materialist/post-materialist research, at the
societal level, offers any significant information about individual consumers and
their “day-to-day consumption choices” (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p. 306).
Belk (1983, 1984, 1985) substantially advanced the stream of materialism-
related research when he developed a multifactor 24-item Likert-scale rating type
of instrument designed to assess three personality trait areas thought to collectively
reveal materialistic attitudes and behavior. The first of the three trait domains is
“possessiveness,” defined as “the inclination and tendency to retain control or
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ownership of one’s possessions” (Belk, 1985, p. 267). The second trait area,
identified and measured by Belk (1985, p. 268), is “nongenerosity,” defined as “an
unwillingness to give possessions or to share possessions with others.” The final
trait, measured by the Belk (1985, p. 268) instrument, is “envy,” defined as
“displeasure and ill will at the superiority of (another person) in happiness, success,
reputation, or the possession of anything desirable.”
Belk (1984, p. 291) characterized materialism as “the importance a
consumer attaches to worldly possessions.” He believed “at the highest levels of
materialism, such possessions assume a central place in a person’s life and are
believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and dissatisfaction” (Belk,
1984, p. 291). Belk (1985) reviewed the history (both ancient and modern) of
materialistic behavior and concluded its occurrence has assumed greater
proportions in the modern Western world, specifically in twentieth century
America. The rising incidence of materialism is attributed to increased societal
affluence, which has allowed evermore people to aggregate and consume far
beyond the basic necessities of life. Individual, rather than cultural or societal,
differences in levels of materialism were of specific interest (Belk, 1985). Belk
(1985) declared the major theological traditions have long rejected materialism and
generally held it to be irreconcilable with the spiritual or traditional values.
According to Belk (1985), secular commentators, as well, have generally
disapproved of the observed and assumed detrimental impacts, both individual and
communal, of materialistic behavior.
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In a review of earlier efforts to measure materialism, Belk (1985, p. 267)
found the methods developed by his predecessors to be either “limited or
tangential.” He judged the Campbell (1969) materialism scale to be a reasonable
measure of attitudes toward materialism in others, or in society as a whole, but a
poor gauge of attitudes and beliefs guiding personal materialistic behavior. Also,
the Campbell (1969) scale had not been empirically tested. Yamauchi and Templer
(1982) developed an instrument designed to measure acquisitive beliefs about
money, but not specifically about material possessions. Moschis and Churchill
(1978) proposed a somewhat more comprehensive instrument intended to measure
viewpoints toward both wealth and belongings. It, however, was not widely
adopted by other researchers (Belk, 1985).
Belk (1985) found other researchers had documented changes in personal
levels of materialism over the human lifespan. Generally, those changes were
attributed to altered life goals or motivations that come with increased age. He
concluded, from the earlier studies and his own observations, materialistic attitudes
and behavior typically increase throughout early adulthood into middle age, but
then wane in the later stages of life (Belk, 1985).
Shama and Widenblit (1984, p. 231) examined the non-materialistic values
of the “voluntary simplicity” lifestyle. They described voluntary simplicity
(perhaps a near opposite of materialism) as a way of life involving “low
consumption, ecological responsibility and self-sufficiency” (Shama and Wisenblit,
1984, p. 231). Small, but significant, relationships were identified between
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behaviors associated with voluntary simplicity and various other values such as
concern for the environment, personal growth, and independence (Shama and
Wisenblit, 1984).
De Young (1985-1986) contributed a sparse, contrarious instrument,
measuring non-materialism, by using only four items with a Likert-scale
arrangement that he tested on a group of adult subjects. Richins (1987) then
entered the picture with a six-item, Likert-scale format instrument, also using adult
subjects, which again sought to measure materialism itself. Heslin, Johnson, and
Blake (1989) followed with another six-item Likert-scale design that was more
rigorously tested than any of the previous efforts.
Rassuli and Hollander (1986, p. 16) examined possible relationships
between modern capitalism and the “culture of consumption” which they believed
lead to an atmosphere of “acquisitiveness and materialism.” They detailed several
moral and ethical criticisms of high consumption levels, but also acknowledged the
attendant economic benefits that may accrue to both the individual and society
(Rassuli and Hollander, 1986). Richins (1987, p. 352) wrote of a possible link
between materialism or, the consumer culture, and what she described as “bad
values.” Richins (1987, p. 353) also alludes to the “material values” as though
there may be some particular group of negative traits, such as “possessiveness, non-
generosity, (and) envy,” identified earlier by Belk (1985), that are somehow
associated with, or causational factors of, materialism.
36
Cushman (1990) joined earlier social psychologists and historians, such as
Lears (1983) and Susman (1973), in examination of the materialism of modern
American culture. That research stream focused on the quest for the underlying
origins, or contributing forces, of materialistic behavior and attitudes. One
explanation, the “empty self,” that yearns to fill a psychological void by acquiring
and consuming, is thought to be the product of a personal, internal conflict between
societal and individual values (Cushman, 1990, p. 603). The political and
economic forces of the American style of democratic capitalism encourage social
values that may oppose more altruistic, or traditional, internal values (Cushman,
1990). The American combination of socioeconomic systems is apt to allow the
forces of a relatively free marketplace to encourage widespread and “continual
consumption of nonessential and quickly obsolete items and experiences”
(Cushman, 1990, p. 600-601).
In the mid-1980’s Rochberg-Halton (1986, p. 221) reported the “pursuit of
money’s possessions” had been elevated to the “status of an ultimate goal in
modern life.” Human values are thought to direct mankind’s search for purpose in
life. Humankind’s quest for fundamental objectives will likely find fruition among
the communal values, not the peculiarly self-seeking ones that might guide the
modern materialistic age (Horowitz, 1985; Wilson, 1993). In an analysis of the
phenomenon of increasing materialism, Easterlin and Crimmins (1991) noted a
recent change in life goals for US. youth. They accepted the premise that changing
“value orientations” are a primary cause in the shift toward materialistic pursuits
37
and away from other goals in life (Easterlin and Crimmins, 1991, p. 499). Dimma
(1991, p. 8) observed that the “spiritual values” were losing sway with Americans
as they became more inclined to favor “materialism, hedonism, and greed.”
Whitcraft (1989, p. 192) believed that despite the “genetic predisposition of
humans to make altruistic decisions,” that the consumer culture of the 1980’s was
causing Americans to become addicted to “self-indulgent materialism.”
Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 305) stated they, as well as other researchers,
rejected the idea that there may be “good and bad” forms of materialism. Earlier
researchers had proposed that materialistic consumption, intended as “an essential
means” to further some worthy “personal values” or life goals, is a rather benign
type, or “instrumental” form, of materialism (Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-
Halton, 1978, p. 8). Consumption not intended to gain some other, more virtuous,
end-state or result was labeled as “terminal” materialism (Csikszentmihalyi and
Rochberg—Halton, 1978, p. 8). Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 305) cited
“difficulties operationalizing” measurement of “instrumental (and) terminal forms”
of materialism and their aversion to the inherent “value judgments” required by that
concept. Richins (1990), and later Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 307), examined
and reviewed the “nature of the (materialism) construct” as a prelude to
ascertaining the “appropriate measurement approach.”
Richins and Dawson (1992) recognized the intertwining nature of
materialism research and the investigation of human values. They therefore
examined Rokeach’s (1973, p. 5) values research and his definition of a value as
38
“an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is
personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or
end-state of existence.” Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 307) also point to earlier
descriptions of the nature of materialism where researchers found that materialistic
consumers believe “possession of things is the ultimate source of happiness,” or
they create a “religion out of things,” and that “materialism organizes” consumers
very existence to the “extent” that it becomes a dominant “lifestyle” (Belk, 1984;
Bredemeier and Toby, 1960; Daun, 1983). These various “descriptions” align well
with the Rokeach (1973) “characterizations of values” and the conclusion that
“defining materialism as a value” is consistent with the body of literature available
at the time (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p. 308).
Richins and Dawson (1992) set aside many other researchable issues
concerning materialism, such as associated personality characteristics, social or
political causes and consequences, and personal or ethical implications (Belk,
1983; Foumier and Richins, 1991). They instead sought to outline consistent
themes from the literature that may provide a comprehensive portrait of
materialism itself. Three defining premises of materialism were identified in the
theoretical literature:
1) Acquisition Centrality (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p. 304). Acquisition
holds a central or defining position in the lives of materialistic
consumers (Richins and Dawson, 1992). Daun (1983) described
materialism as a way of life that is so critical to certain persons they are
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almost obsessed with formulating strategies for elevated levels of
consumption activity. Earlier researchers described a materialistic life-
style as one that approached something akin to religious fervor for both
purchasing activities and the objects themselves (Bredemeier and Toby,
1960). Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton (1981, p. 231) observed
that for some materialists become so devoted to their activities that
“consumption for the sake of consumption becomes a fever that
consumes all the potential energy it can get access to.”
2) Acquisition as the Pursuit ofHappiness (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p.
304). The human quest for happiness becomes largely focused on
acquisition in those who are materialistic (Richins and Dawson, 1992).
Belk (1984, p. 291) observed that “at the highest levels of
materialism. . .possessions assume a central place in a person’s life and
are believed to provide the greatest sources of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction.” Ward and Wackman (1971, p. 426) recognize a similar
pattern when they describe materialism as “an orientation emphasizing
possessions and money for personal happiness and social progress.”
Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 331) conclude that it is “the pursuit of
happiness through acquisition” to the exclusion of “other means (such
as personal relationships, experiences, or achievements) that
distinguishes materialism.”
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3) Possession-defined Success (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p. 304).
“Materialists tend to judge their own and others’ success by the number
and quality of possessions accumulated” (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p.
331). Du Bois (1955) and Weber ( 1958) earlier noted the degree to
which materialistic persons seem to equate the number and quality of
material possessions with success in life. Another researcher observed
that some tend to value possessions based on the price tag rather than
the utility or gratification achieved (Heilbroner, 1956). Du Bois (1955)
seemed to allude to a particular attitude or belief system orientation
when he noted “that materialists consider material well-being as
evidence of success and proof of right-mindedness” (Richins and
Dawson, 1992, p. 304). Materialists tend to develop an inordinate
concern for the ways in which purchased goods or experiences can
contribute to an enhanced image, either of themselves or their
perceptions of others (Campbell, 1987; Richins and Dawson, 1992).
Foumier and Richins (1991) found each of these three defining materialism
themes of the theoretical literature to be supported by closely concomitant
perceptions of materialism within the popular literature, as well as, and amongst
“ordinary consumers” (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p. 304).
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Human Values Defined
The term value is defined by one popular dictionary, in the sense most
applicable here, as “a principle, standard, or quality considered worthwhile or
desirable. To regard highly; prize; esteem” (Morris, 1981, p. 1415). Another
dictionary defines a value as “a principal, standard, or quality considered
worthwhile or desirable” (Costello, 1996, p. 1344). Common synonyms for values
are ideals, standards, morals, and principles. Some particular values terminology,
such as human value systems, is more recent, and might include reference to such
principles, or life goals, as self-discipline, love, humility, wisdom, freedom,
equality, health, security, and others. Yet a third dictionary defines value system as
“a set of personal principles and standards” (Abate, 1999, 1388). Values
researcher, Shalom Schwartz (1994, p. 21) defines values as “desirable trans-
situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life
of a person or other social entity.” Meglino and Ravlin (1998, p. 355) simplify the
definition of a “value as a person’s internalized belief about how he or she should
or ought to behave.”
Modern philosopher, James Q. Wilson (1997, p. x) contends the term
“values” is a “code word for virtue or morality” made necessary by society’s
current desire to be nonjudgmental and to “find a way of speaking that will not
offend anyone.” Wilson (1997, p. xii) describes his proposition of the universal
existence of “a moral sense,” as the idea that there exists an “intuitive or directly
felt belief about how one ought to act when one is free to act voluntarily.” Given
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this theory of a universal human “moral sense,” Wilson (1997, p. 6) takes strong
issue with those who would restrain all discussion of what is “good, right, or
acceptable” about virtue, morality, and character, or their contemporary
equivalent—values.
Origins of the Concept of Values
A cursory concordance search, in the basic literatures of the world’s major
religions (Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam), reveals
theological references to most, if not all, of the 57 individual values identified by
the Schwartz Value Survey (1992), within each stream of literature (Van Voorst,
2000). For example, the concept of love for mankind is advocated by each major
religious tradition. “Hatred ceases by love; this is an old rule” is a Buddhist
concept (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 89). Confucianism advocates “It is only the truly
virtuous man who can love. . .others” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 153). “In whose heart
love is planted, shall make this woman love me” is a Hindu belief (Van Voorst,
2000, p. 50). “Love (not) the evil-doers. . .love (only) the righteous” is an Islamic
tenet (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 308). From the Psalms of Judaism comes “Only
goodness and steadfast love shall pursue me all the days of my life” (Van Voorst,
2000, p. 219). “Love is patient; love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or
arrogant or rude” is a Christian belief (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 277).
The ancient secular, philosophical literature, dating from the early Greeks,
is similarly replete with references to the common, widely identified values
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(Rokeach, 1973; Wilson, 1997). Pliny the Younger frequently wrote of the “many
and great virtues” such as “piety and reverence” (Bartleby.com, n.d.). Plutarch
advocated upholding man’s “virtues and good parts. . .especially (a) mild and
upright temperament (Bartleby.com, n.d.). Cicero wrote of the ability “to bear bad
fortune. . .well (as) only one of all the virtues” (Bartleby.com, n.d.). Marcus
Aurelius Antoninus perceived the pursuit of certain virtues to be the “property of
the rational soul, love of one’s neighbor, and truth and modesty, and to value
nothing more than itself” (Bartleby.com, n.d.). Antoninus saw justice as the
guiding virtue—“in justice the other virtues have their foundation” (Bartelby.com,
n.d.). The notion that there is a common human value system with individual
values orientations is not new. “There is not the same opinion about all the things
which in some way or other are considered by the majority to be good, but only
about some certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest”
(Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Bartleby.com, n.d.). Antoninus (Bartleby.com, n.d.),
when he alluded to the “things which concern the common interest,” almost 1900
years ago, may have been referring to the same set of human values later identified
by Schwartz (1994, p. 35) as the “self-transcendence” and “conservation” values.
Among the “examples of the virtues” that Antoninus found worthy were “truth,
justice, modesty, liberality” and “a benevolent disposition” (Bartleby.com, n.d. ).
CS. Lewis (1944, p. 16) reviewed both the ancient philosophical and
theological traditions before concluding that values, or at least those recognized as
virtues, are “the ordinate condition of the affections in which every object is
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accorded that kind of degree of love which is appropriate to it.” He believed that
the same basic concept of “ordinate affections,” “just sentiments,” or a “doctrine of
objective value” exists in various formulations common to the “Platonic,
Aristotelian, Stoic, Christian, and Oriental” streams of literature (Lewis, 1944, p.
18).
Values Research in the Modern Era
A philosophical “theory of values” was reviewed and refined by Schneider
(1917, p. 141) in the academic literature of the early twentieth century. He
borrowed from, and built upon, thought aimed at “the determination of human
goods” from the economic, ethical, theological, and psychological literature
(Schneider, 1917, p. 142). Schneider (1917) rightly discerned that values seem to
depend, at least to some extent, on each individual’s unique perspective. That
which is an important principle to one may not be to another, subject to each
person’s “value judgment” (Schneider, 1917, p. 141). He observed that value
truths appear to vary by social group, nation, and over time—“everything seems to
depend on individual standpoints, upon individual desires” (Schneider, 1917, p.
143). Conversely, Schneider (1917) also observed that many, if not all, people feel
that certain values (either spiritual or secular or both) are absolute and eternal.
After reflection on the question of whether human values are either subjective or
objective, Schneider (1917, p. 147) noted, almost in passing, the “relative” nature
of the “controlling and guiding factors of human experience.” However, he
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concluded, “of course values are objective” (Schneider, 1917, p. 147). Schneider
(1917, p. 147) pondered whether one can experimentally measure judgments about
relative preferences and “tabulate the results of these experiments and get certain
correlations and agreements. . .(that) indicate anything significant about values.”
He also determined that values “must be studied in their functional relationships”
(Schneider, 1917, p. 148).
Schneider (1917, p. 151) made an effort at “establishing and relating types
of values” identifying six (6) possible types: “economic, ethical, esthetic, religious,
logical, and biological,” while offering that there are “perhaps one or two more.”
He, ultimately, decided that a ranking or empirical evaluation of values or value
types is fraught with problems and beyond the scope of his analysis. Interestingly,
Schneider (1917, p. 153) stated as “an empirical fact” that values are “standards
(that) control our conduct.”
Geiger (1944, p. 292) reviewed the state of “value theory” and defined
values as “man’s long-time preferences. . .in the central area encompassing his basic
attitudes of life, his deep-rooted tastes and interests, his objects of respect and
reverence.” He referred to the everyday use of human value systems as a matter of
“conflict (and) choices” either on a conscious or unconscious level (Geiger, 1944,
p. 293). Geiger alluded to the phrases human “ethical system” and “hierarchy of
values” and wondered whether there is a “right hierarchy of values” (Geiger, 1944,
p. 293, 295). Interestingly, Geiger (1944) mentioned materialism as one example
of the results of failure to strive for a higher ordering of human ethical values.
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At mid-century Lovejoy (1950, p. 597) identified as “terminal” and
“adjectival” values the two classifications that later researchers would label
terminal and instrumental values (Schwartz, 1992). Terminal values are those,
which could be called an end-state, in and of themselves, while instrumental values
are those that cause actions leading to some desired end-state. Lovejoy (1950) also
saw values as the ethical or preferential framework by which man makes everyday
choices and judgments about the choices of others.
Catton (1954) explored the reasons that little had been accomplished in the
scientific study of values and value systems. He attributed that failure to the
attitude among philosophers and social scientists that values are “highly abstract”
and therefore not “quantitatively” measurable (Catton, 1954, p. 49). He concluded,
however, that “human values. . .(are) measurable relative to each other” and that it
is incumbent on the researcher to devise appropriate methods of measuring
subjects’ relative “value judgments” (Catton, 1954, p. 55). Catton (1956, p. 357,
359) followed up his hypothesis with research indicating that “human values” are
indeed “measurable relative to each other in the same manner as other verbal
stimuli” and that “standard scaling procedures” are applicable even when some
values are considered to be of “infinite worth.” Catton (1959, p. 310) later
envisioned what are now referred to as human value systems as “preferences (that)
are not random, but patterned (and) relatively stable.” He defined a value as “a
conception of the desirable which is implied by a set of preferential responses to
symbolic desiderata” (Catton, 1959, p. 312). Catton (1959, p. 315-316) further
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hypothesized that “value-space. . .is probably multidimensional” and suggested
further, empirically based, investigation of the value—space structure.
Allport, Vernon, and Lindsey (1961) published and periodically refined and
republished A Study of Values, over a period three decades. They theorized that
human values are measurable and might be categorized into six value types or
domains:
1) The Theoretical — the principal value in this domain is truth or reason.
2) The Economic — persons who value consumption and wealth
accumulation.
3) The Aesthetic — persons who value form and harmony.
4) The Social — altruism — the highest value in this domain is love.
5) The Political — one who is motivated primarily by power.
6) The Religious — the principal value of this type is unity.
Significant differences were found, between the sexes, in value systems among
college students (Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey, 1960). Females tended to score
higher in the aesthetic, religious, and social realms, while males tended to more
highly value the theoretical, political, and economic domains (Allport, Vernon, and
Lindzey, 1960).
Milton Rokeach (1960, p. 18) observed that the study of beliefs and
attitudes had focused primarily on individual beliefs or attitudes and not on “belief
systems” and “attitude systems.” He thus began a lifetime of study “on the belief
system as a whole” based on his proposition that human behavior could best be
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interpreted by “relating such behavior to man’s belief systems” (Rokeach, 1960, p.
18-19). Rokeach (1960) envisioned three primary dimensions in his theory of
belief systems. The first was expressed as a belief-disbelief dimension with closely
related individual beliefs or attitudes sharing space along a continuum in opposition
to corresponding disbeliefs that would be relatively inconsistent with the beliefs.
The second dimension was described as central-peripheral with three layers of
beliefs with a central core of values bordered by intermediate and then peripheral
beliefs. In this conception, central beliefs might be associated with the lower or
physical human needs progressing to the peripheral beliefs that would be related to
man’s higher aesthetic or self-actualization needs. The third dimension Rokeach
(1960) described involved a time-perspective factor with variation in the belief
system dependent on whether the individual behavior or decision in question
involved a past, present, or future context. The motivation for his early research in
the field was to “develop a way of thinking” making it “possible to describe and to
measure the organization of all belief systems, and to describe individual
differences in such organization” (Rokeach, 1960, p. 389).
Fallding (1965) proposed that values might be arranged along either of two
axes in two-dimensional space. The first is described as the "egoistic-collectivity”
axis and the second as the “expansion-restriction” axis (Fallding, 1965, p. 228).
Expansion means desirable ends are sought by an increase in breadth, while
restriction means ends are attained by increased intensity. Using the perpendicular
axes to divide values space, persons fall within one of four value orientations:
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ownership (egoistic expansion), interest (egoistic restriction), membership
(collectivity expansion), or partisanship (collectivity restriction) (Fallding, 1965).
Rokeach (1968-1969, p. 547) did public opinion polling and research,
which led him from his earlier conceptual research in “belief system theory” to
curiosity about the specific “values underlying public opinion.” He determined
there was no empirically reliable system to methodically determine those values
(Rokeach, 1968-1969). Rokeach (1968-1969) believed it important to public
opinion research to understand the values systems that feed those opinions and to
honestly account for the value preferences of not only those being polled, but also
of the clients and pollsters. Rokeach, 1968-1969, p. 550) began a review of the
extant research on values by asking, “If a persons values form a value system, in
what sense do they constitute a system and by what operations can such a system
be revealed?” He noted that if a person “has a value (it) is to say that he has an
enduring belief that a particular mode of conduct or that a particular end-state of
existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or
end-states of existence” (Rokeach, 1968-1969, p. 550). Among other attributes,
Rokeach proposed that values direct our actions, desires, attitudes, behavior, moral
judgments, and comparisons with others. One observation by Rokeach (1968-
1969) is particularly interesting in the context of the current, politically correct,
notion that everyone should avoid judging, or even attempting to influence, another
persons values. He believed that “if you claim to have a value and you do not want
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to influence anyone else. . .to have it too, the chances are it it’s not a value”
(Rokeach, 1968-1969, p. 550).
The end-state and mode-of-conduct values classifications were redefined by
Rokeach (1968-1969, p. 551) as “instrumental and “terminal” values. He saw a
value system simply as a “hierarchical arrangement of values. . .along a continuum
of importance” (Rokeach, 1968-1969, p. 551). Rokeach (1968-1969, p. 552)
enumerated “culture, social system, class, sex, occupation, education, religion, and
political” affiliation among the many variables that are “likely to shape. . .the value
systems of large numbers of people.” He also believed that while attitudes and
beliefs can number in the thousands, specific values are finite and few, perhaps
more than 50, but certainly less than 100 (Rokeach, 1968-1969).
Rokeach (1968-1969) developed an instrument for the purpose of rank
ordering 36 specific values, equally divided between categories he termed as
terminal and instrumental. The terminal categories were: a comfortable life, an
exciting life, a sense of accomplishment, a world at peace, a world of beauty,
equality, family security, freedom, happiness, inner harmony, mature love, national
security, pleasure, salvation, self-respect, social recognition, true friendship, and
wisdom. The instrumental values were: ambitious, broadminded, capable, cheerful,
clean, courageous, forgiving, helpful, honest, imaginative, independent,
intellectual, logical, loving, obedient, polite, responsible, and self-controlled.
In the course of testing and validating the instrument, Rokeach (1968-1969)
identified a number of value differences between certain demographic groups:
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churchgoers and non-churchgoers, political liberals and conservatives, and between
the black and white races.
In the early 1970’s Rokeach (1973) authored The Nature ofHuman Values.
He described a value as “an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-
state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse
mode of conduct or end-state of existence” and a “value system (as) an enduring
organization of beliefs. . .along a continuum of relative importance” (Rokeach,
1973, p. 5). Again values were classified as either terminal or instrumental in
nature. Terminal values, in his view, were further divided into those with either
personal or social motivations, while instrumental values were viewed as either
related to morality or to competence. Competence, or self—actualization, values are
the instrumental versions of personal values and moral values are the instrumental
renditions of the social values. Rokeach (1973) takes great care not only to closely
define values, but also to differentiate values from attitudes, social norms, needs,
traits, interests, and other, somewhat related, concepts. He proposed that a value
“transcends attitudes toward objects and toward situations: it is a standard that
guides and determines action, attitudes toward objects and situations, ideology,
presentations of self to others, evaluations, judgments, justifications, comparisons
of self to others, and attempts to influence others” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 25). The
value survey was described as “an ideal instrument” that is both a “reasonably
reliable and valid” measure of the value “variables that are of central importance to
the individual and to his society (Rokeach, 1973, p. 51). Rokeach (1973) quoted
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Kaplan’s (1964, p. 28) law of the instrument: “Give a small boy a hammer, and he
will find that everything he encounters will need pounding” in predicting that his
value survey would become widely used. Rokeach (1973, p. 52) saw almost
unlimited application for a system of values measurement when he suggested, “the
measurement of values is relevant to virtually any human problem one might be
able to think of.”
Kitwood and Smithers (1974, p. 175) described the Rokeach (1973) survey
of values as the “latest and. . .most impressive” approach to measure “accurately the
nature of human valuing.” Despite that praise, they also concluded the Rokeach
(1973) survey of values suffers from an “important weakness, (an) inadequate
conception of human values” and that “methods for the study of values. . .are as yet
poorly developed” (Kitwood and Smithers, 1974, p. 175). Rokeach is credited with
advancing understanding of the “centrality of values in the understanding of human
behavior” (Kitwood and Smithers, 1974, p. 176). Kitwood and Smithers (1974)
find fault, principally, with Rokeach’s (1973) reliance on a ranking system of 36
discrete values and cite research indicating that humans can typically only hold
somewhere in the range of five to nine categories in mind simultaneously.
Bengston and Lovejoy (1973) explored antecedent links to certain values
such as personality and social structure. They defined values as “conceptions of
the desirable--self sufficient ends which can be (rank) ordered and which serve as
orientations to action” and further described them as “the background assumptions
used in making difficult decisions. . .throughout life” (Bengston and Lovejoy, 1973,
53
p. 883). It is supposed that “value (systems) arise from, and covary with,
both. . .social (condition) and. . .personality” (Bengston and Lovejoy, 1973, p. 883).
Values are seen as central to each person’s system of beliefs and behaviors, and
therefore important to the comprehension of human stimulation and resulting
conduct.
Bengston and Lovejoy (1973) operationalized the paradigm that Fallding
(1965) proposed with an instrument designed for the rank ordering of 16 discrete
values: finances, possessions, appearance, respect, service, equality, peace, ethical
life, skill, excitement, freedom, achievement, religious participation, loyalty,
patriotism, and friendship. Factor analysis “resulted in two independent bipolar
dimensions, providing corroboration for Fallding’s typology” (Bengston and
Lovejoy, 1973, p. 890). The first factor was labeled as “materialism/humanism”
and the second as “individual/institutional orientation” (Bengston and Lovejoy,
1973, 892). The first eight values listed above are on the materialism/humanism
axis and the final eight comprise the individual/institutional factor. Bengston and
Lovejoy (1973 were quite surprised at the lack of evidence for values differences
by social class, and gender. Age was a significant predictor of values shifts that
occurred as persons moved from youth to middle age and then to old age (Bengston
and Lovejoy, 1973).
Bengston (1975) later expanded his values research and re-stated his
concept that values fall within one of four domains or types, defined as humanism,
collectivism, materialism, and individualism. Bengston (1975) again used the same
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sixteen specific values, identified by Bengston and Lovejoy (1973), choosing four
to reflect each of the value types:
Humanism — equality, service, world peace, and ethical life.
Materialism — financial comfort, respect, possessions, and appearance.
Collectivism — religious participation, friendship, loyalty, and patriotism.
Individualism — exciting life, achievement, skill, and personal freedom.
Bengston’s (1975) most interesting findings support the concept that materialistic
values shift upward and then downward with age; parents are more materialistic
than youths, but grandparent attitudes are more closely aligned with the youngest
generation. There is also evidence that family, social, and peer groups influence
values.
Rankin and Grube (1980) returned to the Rokeach (1973) value survey and
tackled the issue of whether value rankings are empirically appropriate, when
compared to a value rating system. An instrument was devised that allowed
subjects to rate each of the 36 values on a scale of one to 99. Results from that
instrument were compared with those from the Rokeach (1973) ranking system.
The “general conclusion (was) that the two methods of collecting data on value
systems differ to some extent, but not enough to warrant disuse of the. . .Rokeach
(1973) value survey” (Rankin and Grube, 1980, p. 243). In fact, they found very
little difference in convergent and discriminant validity, test-retest reliability, and
only slightly more favorable multiple regression construct validity with the ranked
data. Reynolds and Jolly (1980) conducted similar, but not identical, comparisons
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of ranked versus rated data for the Rokeach Value Survey (1973) items. They
utilized a seven-point Likert scale measure and concluded the “rating scale method
proves to be significantly less reliable than. . .rank ordering” (Reynolds and Jolly,
1980, p. 535). Munson and McIntyre (1979) conducted similar research, but found
ratings with a Likert scale were “not significantly less reliable” (Reynolds, and
Jolly, 1980, p. 531).
Spates (1983, p. 42) thoroughly reviewed nearly a century of scholarly
thought and research on values and concluded “the most significant advance has
come from the work of Milton Rokeach” with his value survey resulting in “the
most completed portrait yet of American values.” The Rokeach (1973) value
survey, since it’s development, has been independently validated and used
extensively by researchers in several other cultures. Spates (1983, p. 44) concluded
his review of values research by posing two critical questions: “Do value-
orientations (sets of linked values) exist?” and “Do values correlate with
behavior?”
Braithwaite and Law (1985, p. 251) observed that Rokeach’s (1973)
“criteria for item selection have been criticized on the grounds of arbitrariness and
subjectivity.” Rokeach (1973, p. 30) had, however, acknowledged that his process
for selecting the 36 specific values was “an intuitive one.” Rokeach (1973, p. 27)
argued only that his chosen 36 items provided a “reasonably comprehensive”
sampling of all-important human values. Braithwaite and Law (1985, p. 252)
reviewed the various other criticisms of the rank ordering system of the Rokeach
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(1973) value survey, but noted that the “success with which (it) has been used
vindicates the. . .measurement technique to some extent.” Braithwaite and Law
(1985) conducted extensive subject interviews to ascertain whether the inventory of
values identified by Rokeach (1973) accurately reflected the true, entire array of
human values. A number of added potential values were identified and many of the
original Rokeach (1973) values were separated into components. A new,
asymmetrical, seven-point rating scale, containing the additional values along with
those identified by Rokeach (1973), was developed and tested (Braithwaite and
Law, 1985). Braithwaite and Law (1985) identified additional values in the areas
of physical development and well being, along with the concepts of security,
privacy, and freedom that were not adequately represented in the Rokeach (1973)
value survey. They reported empirical support for a total of 79 value scale items
representing 14 value constructs or types (Braithwaite and Law, 1985).
Alwin and Krosnick (1985) also turned their attention to the issue of ratings
versus rankings for the measurement of values. Alwin and Krosnick (1985)
reviewed the pros and cons of each approach among those who have been
proponents of rankings (Rokeach, 1973; Allport et al., 1960; Bengston, 1975) as
well as those who have been critics of rankings and have proposed or argued
instead for value ratings (Munson and McIntyre, 1979; Braithwaite and Law,
1985). They found that “past research suggests that rating techniques may be used
just as effectively” as ranking methods (Alwin and Krosnick, 1985, p. 548). Alwin
and Krosnick (1985, p. 549) did not, however, construe from the analysis of
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comparative data that “ratings and rankings are interchangeable in the measurement
of values” because “the ranking approach may create artificial contrasts among the
...content of the measures.” Although ratings and rankings “measure somewhat
different things” it still cannot be determined “that one (or the other) is the more
valid approach” (Alwin and Krosnick, 1985, p. 550).
Kahle, Beatty, and Homer (1986) reviewed and empirically compared two
methodologies that were developed for the measurement of consumer values. The
first was values and life style (VALS) developed by SRI International and the
second was the list of values (LOV) developed by Kahle (1983). Although both
VALS and LOV draw from, and complement, values research, each is limited. The
LOV survey is drawn from Rokeach’s (1973) Values Survey. It is a smaller set of
those values, thought to be, related to everyday life decisions. Neither VALS or
LOV is intended to represent or measure the entirety of the human value system;
only certain values that are consumer related.
Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, p. 550) entered values research with the goal of
investigating or finding “a universal psychological structure of human values.”
Based on a review of the literature, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, p. 551) defined
values as “concepts or beliefs, about desirable end states or behaviors, that
transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behavior and events,
and are ordered by relative importance.” They described the “structure of human
values” as the “conceptual organization of values on the basis of their similarities
and differences” (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, p. 550). Schwartz and Bilsky (1987,
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p. 551) initially identified seven categories, or “motivational domains,” of values
drawn primarily from a review of the specific values in the Rokeach (1973) Value
Survey. The identified domains were enjoyment, security, achievement, self-
direction, restrictive-conformity, prosocial, social power, and maturity. Schwartz
and Bilsky (1987) hypothesized that smallest space analysis statistical methodology
would allow mapping of the value points in a two-dimensional space resembling a
pie shape. It was envisioned that each domain would occupy space approximating
a slice of the pie and the collective domains identified as prosocial, restrictive-
conforrnity, and perhaps security would stand opposite the individualistic domains
of self-direction, achievement, and enjoyment. Maturity was viewed as a “mixed”
domain, falling neither into the collectivist nor the individualistic category
(Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, p. 553). Israeli teachers and German students served
as subjects for translated versions of the Rokeach (1973) value survey (Schwartz
and Bilsky, 1987). Respondents were asked to rank order values and then to rate
adjoining values on a seven-point scale. The ranking and rating data were then
combined into a rating with a potential range of 120 points (Schwartz and Bilsky,
1987).
It was concluded the “evidence clearly supports the existence of the seven
basic motivational domains” but also found evidence for a few
“additional. . .domains” such as ones that might be labeled “social power” and
“tradition maintenance” (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987, p. 560). It was also noted that
the security domain might be, more appropriately, divided into individual and
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collective categories. In addition to the new data collected, Schwartz and Bilsky
(1987, p. 561) also reanalyzed data from a number of previous value studies and
concluded that smallest space analysis seemed to “reveal that the structure of values
we have postulated might be present there as well” (Braithwaite and Law, 1985;
Rokeach, 1973).
Crosby, Bitner, and Gill (1990, p. 126) hypothesized that values may be
structurally arranged into each of seven “dimensions.” Conformity, virtuous, self-
direction, idealism, self-actualization, security, and hedonism were identified as the
defining categories of human values. Respondents were asked to both rank order
and rate (on a seven-point scale) the 36 values of the Rokeach (1973) values survey
and the hypothesized structure was analyzed using LISREL techniques. The results
confirmed that values are not independent, and the specific “organizational
structures were as hypothesized,” although it was suggested that the existence of
additional values may be indicated (Crosby, Bitner, and Gill, 1990, p. 132).
Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) greatly expanded their cross-cultural values
research database by adding samples from five additional countries. Again, they
utilized the basic Rokeach (1973) values survey, but with four (4) values added to
the original thirty-six (36) for most samples, and with a completely revised list of
57 values for others. One purpose for the continued research was to explore the
issue of whether the distinction between instrumental and terminal values is valid.
It was noted that people do “not distinguish clearly between” the two categories
and that “the distinction between ends and means is not clear-cut” (Schwartz and
60
Bilsky, 1990, p. 882). Terminal values are generally expressed as nouns and
instrumental values are phrased as adjectives, but either can easily be converted to
the other without apparent effect on rankings or ratings.
The additional data collected by Schwartz and Bilsky (1990) confirmed the
earlier observed distinction between individualistic and collective interest
groupings of the value domains. The seven distinct regions or domains arrayed
around a pie-shape identified earlier were confirmed and the “findings demonstrate
that specific values fall into clearly defined motivational categories” (Schwartz and
Bilsky, 1990, p. 889). It was reported that preliminary analysis of the data
collected with the 57-value survey might indicate the existence of “three or four
new (value) domains” (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990, p. 890). Later that year,
Schwartz (1990, p. 139) reported on further analysis of the data and proposed “the
individualism-collectivism dichotomy” earlier hypothesized “overlooks values that
inherently serve both individual and collective interests” and forms “the mistaken
assumption that. . .individualist and collectivist values form opposing syndromes.”
It was suggested that further research might reveal additional and/or refined value
categories (Schwartz, 1990).
Corfman, Lehman, and Narayanan (1991) reviewed and investigated
possible links between various consumer behaviors and the underlying values
orientations that may be associated with them. They described materialism as a
“general value” and utilized the LOV instrument and a consumer survey to identify
correlations between materialism and the self-oriented values of self-respect and
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sense of accomplishment (Corfman, Lehman, and Narayanan, 1991, p. 186).
Kamakura and Mazzon (1991) proposed a consumer-oriented model, more
comprehensive than the LOV and VALS models, based on Rokeach’s (1973)
instrument. It, however, was still not intended as a complete values structure
model. Kamakura and Novak (1992, p. 128) tested the model and found the
“value-system segments we identified fitted clearly into the theoretical structure
proposed by Schwartz and Bilsky” (1987, 1990).
Schwartz (1992, p. 1) described values as the “criteria people use to select
and justify actions and to evaluate people and events.” They are not qualities, nor
or they totally analogous to the common conception of virtues, but are guides or
touchstones by which we steer a path through life. Rokeach (1973, p. 3) believed
that “the value concept, more than any other” could provide an explanatory view
into “human behavior” for all the sciences. Schwartz (1992, p. 3) believed, further,
that “identification of a universal value structure” was a critical step toward
understanding of human behavior.
Schwartz (1992) hypothesized the existence of three additional motivational
categories of values (tradition, stimulation, and power) and modified his conception
of the contents and definitions of four others (enjoyment, maturity, prosocial, and
security). An entirely new, “theory-based survey” was developed “to measure
people’s value priorities” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 16). Schwartz (1992) considered,
and included, versions of values drawn from several other surveys, including the
Rokeach (1973) value survey and that of Braithwaite and Law (1985). 57
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individual values were incorporated. Respondents from 20 countries were asked to
rate values on a nine-point asymmetrical scale, rather than rank, “as a guiding
principle in my life” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 17). Again, smallest space analysis
statistical techniques, yielding a two-dimensional solution, were utilized to
ascertain locational patterns ascribed to various categories of motivational content
for the 57 values (Schwartz, 1992).
One important new finding was that there was “little support for the
terminal-instrumental distinction” (Schwartz, 1992, p. 37). People apparently do
not mentally organize their individual values by any kind of ends-means criterion.
Schwartz (1992, p. 49) suggested that “people usually think of values in noun form
(wisdom rather than wise)” and therefore terminally stated values may be
preferable for survey purposes. People from most of the studied cultures
“distinguish ten types of values. . .as guiding principles in their lives” (Schwartz,
1992, p. 37). Of the 11 hypothesized value domains, only spirituality was not fully
supported empirically by the data and no evidence was found for any other,
unidentified, value category. The ten identified value types are universalism,
benevolence, conformity, tradition, security, power, achievement, hedonism,
stimulation, and self-direction. The ten value categories occupy nine wedge-shaped
areas surrounding a central point and appear quite like a sliced pie; tradition and
conformity share a single wedge space (Schwartz, 1992).
In a political values context, Braithwaite (1994) analyzed responses to value
sets thought to correspond to liberal versus conservative or left versus right
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political leanings. The value sets were drawn from Rokeach (1973) and
Braithwaite and Law (1985). Factor analysis yielded some counterintuitive results,
with values that are seemingly polar opposites indicating positive, not negative,
correlations. Braithwaite’s (1994) findings are, however, consistent with the
Schwartz (1992) view that the entire human value system is generally perceived to
be comprised of positive values. Some of the motivational categories of values
may appear on first examination to embody conflicting goals, but it seems that in
practice they are treated in a more complex fashion as worthy, competing, but not
necessarily mutually exclusive, objectives. Mayton, Ball-Rokeach, and Loges
(1994) contribute support for that view, observing that there is never an absence of
values. “We never prefer dishonesty to honesty, we merely elevate other ways of
behaving, such as ambitious or loyal, in importance relative to honesty” (Mayton,
Ball-Rokeach, and Loges, 1994, p. 3).
The Schwartz (1994) theory of values continued to take shape with an
expanded research base spanning 97 samples, drawn from 44 countries. He
contended that while there is, “an almost infinite number of values,” there are
perhaps only five-dozen or so, arrayed into ten motivational types, that are
necessary to adequately define a universal human value system (Schwartz, 1994, p.
20). Schwartz (1994, p. 21) presented a refined definition of values as “desirable
trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the
life of a person or other social entity.” It was further postulated that “implicit in
this definition of values as goals is that (1) they serve the interests of some social
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entity, (2) they can motivate action—giving it direction and emotional intensity, (3)
they function as standards for judging and justifying action, and (4) they are
acquired both through socialization to dominant group values and through the
unique learning experiences of individuals” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 21). He viewed
the “crucial” aspect of the ten motivational goals, or types, of values as the “content
aspect that distinguishes among” them (Schwartz, 1994, p. 21) (Table 1).
When plotted in two-dimensional space (Figure 1), the ten value types,
occupy nine slices of a pie-shape, with conformity and tradition occupying the
inner and outer portions, respectively, of a single wedge (Schwartz, 1994). The
arrangement, around the pie-shape, is in the order listed above with the final value
type listed, security, being adjacent to the first, power. “The motivational
differences between value types are continuous rather than discrete” according to
Schwartz (1994, p. 25). Adjoining pairs of motivational types share purposeful
emphases. Types that are represented graphically as polar opposites have sharp
motivational, or higher order, contrasts, i.e., self-transcendence versus self-
enhancement (Schwartz, 1994).
Schwartz (1994, p. 26) utilized a nine-point rating system, from negative
one to positive seven, that was first “anchored” by asking respondents to read the
entire values list and select the most important, “as a guiding principle in my life,”
and least important values. The subjects are asked to assign appropriately high or
low ratings to the most and least important values. Again, Schwartz (1994)
principally relied on smallest space analysis projections to identify clusters of
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Table 1: Ten Value Types defined by Schwartz (1992; 1994).
 
Value Types Definition Exemplary Values
Power Social status and prestige, Social power, wealth,
control or dominance over authority
people and resources.
Achievement Personal success through Successful, capable,
demonstrating competence ambitious
according to social standards.
Hedonism Pleasure and sensuous Pleasure, enjoying life
gratification for oneself.
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and Daring, varied life,
challenge in life. exciting life







Universalism Understanding, appreciation, Social justice, equality
broad-minded, tolerance, and
protection for the welfare of
all people and for nature.
Benevolence Preservation and Helpful, honest,
enhancement of welfare of forgiving
frequently contacted people.
Tradition Respect, commitment, and Humble, devout,
acceptance of the customs accepting my portion
and ideas that traditional in life
culture or religion provide.
Conformity Restraint of actions, Politeness, obedient,
inclinations, and impulses honoring parents and
likely to upset others and elders
violate social expectations or
norms
Security Safety, harmony, and National security, stability of society, ofrelationships, and of self.  social order, and clean
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values and assess the accuracy of the predicted motivational groupings. With the
possible exception of a “spirituality” cluster, appearing between benevolence and
tradition in 42 percent of the cultural groups, his analysis indicates, “no major
motivational aspect of values is missing from the theory” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 32).
Schwartz (1994, p. 39) again chose smallest space analysis techniques because
“factors based on raw value ratings are rarely bipolar—individuals show a response
tendency to rate values in general as more or less important.” Smallest space
analysis “structures can reveal conceptual oppositions obscured in factor analysis”
(Schwartz, 1994, p. 39).
Schwartz (1994, p. 35) found “no evidence for (the) distinction” between
“terminal and instrumental values” in the structure, either through smallest space
analysis or factor analysis. It was concluded, “all types of motivational concerns
can be expressed in both terminal and instrumental terms” (Schwartz, 1994, p. 35).
It is speculated that earlier research evidence, indicating a terminal/instrumental
distinction, may have resulted from shifting scale use caused by Schwartz (1994)
and other researchers (Rokeach, 1973) utilizing separate lists for terminal and
instrumental values. Schwartz (1994) also identified four higher order groupings of
values (see Figure 1) that correspond to the axes of the identified two-dimensional
value space. One bipolar axis is represented by “conservation” values (security,
conformity, and tradition) opposed by “openness to change” (stimulation, self-
direction, and a portion of the hedonism space). “Self-enhancement” (power,
achievement, and part of hedonism) is at one pole of the orthogonal axis and “self-
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transcendence” (benevolence and universalism) is located at the other (Schwartz,
1994,p.38)
Johnston (1995) re-examined the Rokeach (1973) value survey searching
for an underlying, but previously unreported, structure. He theorized a two-
dimensional, four-quadrant structure for the terminal values, with the first
dimension described as “mature love” opposed to “national security” and the
second referred to as “exciting life” opposed by “self-respect” values (Johnston,
1995, p. 590). It was believed that the instrumental values assemble in a similar
fashion with “self-control” opposing the “loving and giving” values and with
“imaginative” values opposite those that are “achievement-oriented” (Johnston,
1995, p. 590). Although Johnston (1995) continued to deal with them separately,
he reported no support for his supposition that the terminal and instrumental values
align into separate underlying conceptual structures. In fact, Johnston (1995)
reported, for both terminal and instrumental groupings, a two-dimensional, four-
quadrant structure, that is strikingly similar to the higher order groupings of self-
transcendence, conservation, openness to change, and self-transcendence found by
Schwartz (1994).
In an examination of the relationships between gender and values, Beutel
and Marini (1995) developed a three-factor measure of values orientation. They
theorized that the three primary categories of values are (Beutel and Marini, 1995,
p. 438):
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1) Compassion -— the concern and responsibility for the well-being of
others,
2) Materialism — the emphasis on personal material benefit and
competition,
3) Meaning — philosophical concern with finding meaning and purpose in
life.
Materialism was defined as a measure of concern for material goods, that
includes the competitive interests of “maximizing differences between oneself and
others” (Beutel and Marini, 1995, p. 438). It was also theorized, that “those who
attach importance to finding purpose and meaning in life also tend to attach
importance to the public interest but not to materialism” (Beutel and Marini, 1995,
p. 438). Religiosity was expected to be positively associated with both compassion
and meaning, but not with materialism. Each of the anticipated correlations was
supported by data gathered, over more than two decades, from samples comprised
of US. college students. Females were found to value compassion and meaning
more than materialism, while males reflected the opposite orientation Beutel and
Marini, 1995). Over time, from the early 1970’s until the mid-1990’s, the gap
between gender differences closed somewhat, as females became somewhat more
competitively oriented (Beutel and Marini, 1995).
Isaac (1997, p. 563) argued for the inclusion or “recognition of a moral
dimension to” the study of “consumer choice.” He contended that the classical
economic view of consumer action as derived from the search for economic utility,
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or maximization, ignores motivations that are guided by value systems that are
other than self-interested. Isaac (1997, p. 565) observed that on occasion, “self-
interest may recommend actions that conflict with morality. In an
acknowledgement of the existence of a human value system that obtains to
“motivational plurality,” Isaac (1997, p. 566) conceded consumer behavior may be
the result of unresolved “motivational conflict” and therefore unexplainable within
the “neoclassical paradigm” of morality. Nevertheless, Isaac (1997, p. 568)
contended that theorists must “attend to motivation” and that “moral motivations”
deserve to be incorporated into our models because “moral motivations and self-
interest. . .are strictly incommensurable.”
Roccas and Schwartz (1997, p. 357) examined the “relations between
religiosity and values” and observed, “the primary aim of religion is to temper
materialist tendencies and to encourage transcendence.” Positive correlations were
found between religiosity and the Schwartz (1994) values of conformity, security,
benevolence, and tradition values and negative correlations between religiosity and
the hedonism, stimulation and self-direction value types. Roccas and Schwartz
(1997) also hypothesized that materialism may be closely associated with the non—
religious value groupings and opposed to the religious values.
Kane (1998) proposed a four-dimensional cognitive view of human values.
It was suggested that the first, or most basic, dimension is experiential, arising from
whether our value experiences provoke either positive or negative emotions. An
exciting experience that arouses joy might come to be valued, while if it inspired
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fear then excitement might not be valued. The stream of experiences, called life,
that encompasses purposeful activity directed toward life’s goals, lead to a second
cognitive value dimension based on the relative “success or failure of these
undertakings” (Kane, 1998, p. 582). The degree to which aims are achieved and
whether desires are satisfied by those pursuits is thought to form the second
dimension of a personal value system. Kane’s (1998) third dimension of values is
found in how human self-definition is achieved. As values determine “one’s role in
society” then individuals become uniquely defined by “the quality of their desires
and motivations” and whether they are “more or less decent or indecent, noble or
base, or worthy or unworthy” (Kane, 1998, p. 584).
Kane’s (1998) fourth dimension is designed to deconstruct the modern
notion that values are entirely subjective or relative. It is contended that values, in
the first three dimensions, are both subjective and objective in nature. They are
objective because a person is or is not having some value experience and either
does or does not hold one value above another. Values are also relative “to persons
who have the experiences, pursue the purposes, or share the forms of life” (Kane,
1998, p. 585). Kane (1998, p. 586) sees fourth dimensional value as “non-relative
or universal worth from all points of view, not merely from the point of view of this
or that person (or) society.” While acknowledging that to some “educated
modems, this appears naive,” Kane (1998, p. 588, 593) proposed that some value
orientations are “correct from every point of view” and “when put to the test in
practice lead to the conclusion that some ways of life” are more worthy of respect
71
than others. He contended that the postulated fourth dimension of values makes the
modern objective of “complete value neutrality. . .impossible” (Kane, 1998, p. 595).
Schultz and Zelensky (1998) and Stern, Dietz, and Guagnano (1998)
utilized the Schwartz (1994) survey of values to measure correlations with
environmental behavior. The latter group attempted, with some limited success, to
develop a shortened value survey that would yield similar results (Stern, Dietz, and
Guagnano, 1998). They concluded that as a “broad measure” that approximates the
results of the full instrument, “an inventory consisting of three item measures of the
four value clusters defined” by Schwartz (1994) “provides scores. . .both. . .reliable
and useful as a predictor of relevant attitudes and behavior” (Stern, Dietz, and
Guagnano, 1998, p. 994). It should be noted, however, that the subject research
had a very limited focus associated with specific environmental behaviors, and the
chosen values were those thought to be most relevant to that particular inquiry.
Boehnke, Stromberg, Regmi, Richmond, and Chandra (1998, p. 230) relied on
Schwartz’s (1994) value theory to study the relationships between value systems
and “worries and well-being.” Interestingly, they found the most positive
relationships with “personal and microsocial worries” to be with the Schwartz
(1994) security and hedonism value groupings and that “macrosocial worries” were
related to the universalism, benevolence, and self-direction value categories
(Boehnke, 1998, p. 236).
Meglino and Ravlin (1998, p. 355) reviewed values research from the
perspective of organizational behaviorists and proposed a somewhat simplified
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definition — “we define! a value as a person’s internalized belief about how he or she
should or ought to behave.” In regard to the structure of values systems, they
observed “situations inevitably present themselves where a person’s values come
into conflict” (Meglino and Ravlin, 1998, p. 359). The consensus opinion of recent
researchers is that such conflicts are resolved by individual cognitive processes
entailing “paired comparisons between. . .values” (Meglino and Ravlin, 1998, p.
359).
McCarty and Shrum (2000, p. 274) focused their attention on the issue of
“ranking versus rating” of “personal values constructs.” They acknowledge that
“ratings are generally easier to administer and simpler for respondents to
complete,” but report that ease and simplicity are a tradeoff for “lack of
differentiation (that) can weaken correlations among variables” (McCarty and
Shrum, 2000, p. 275-276). The other commonly used survey methodology,
ranking, has “significant drawbacks,” sometimes forcing “distinctions between
values when none exist,” and generally “more difficult to administer” (McCarty
and Shrum, 2000, p. 276). Based on research conducted with two sample groups, it
was concluded that a “most-least rating procedure” is an attractive alternative to
either ranking or rating (McCarty and Shrum, 2000, p. 277). Respondents are
asked to first choose, from an entire list of values, their “most and least important
values,” and then are asked to rate each value on the list according to their view of
it’s importance (McCarty and Shrum, 2000, p. 277). Although easier to administer,
and less time consuming, than a ranking procedure, the most-least rating procedure
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yields “similar degrees of differentiation” (McCarty and Shrum, 2000, p. 278).
Confirming the appropriateness of the rank, then rate, method utilized by the
Schwartz (1994) value survey, McCarty and Shrum (2000, p. 297) conclude “the
least-most measurement technique may increase the ability of researchers to detect
relations between personal values and other variables of interest.”
Kinnier, Kemes, and Dautheribes (2000, p. 4) developed a “short list” of
“universal moral values” that finds substantial corroboration within the literature of
seven major religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Confucianism,
Taoism, and Buddhism) and from the literature of major secular groups (atheists,
humanists, and from United Nations reports). Although formatted differently, the
findings are strikingly similar to the self-transcendence and conservation
dimensions of the universal values structure identified by Schwartz (1994; Kinnier,
Kemes, and Dautheribes, 2000). Of the 36 individual values, that comprise the two
Schwartz (1994) higher-order value dimensions, there are direct matches or
synonyms for 28 of them on the “short list” (Kinnier, Kemes, and Dautheribes,
2000). Except for self-respect, the value found at the center, or spatial intersection,
of all ten Schwartz (1994) value types, there are no “short list” universal “moral
values” found within Schwartz’ (1994) two higher-order dimensions of self-
enhancement and openness to change (Kinnier, Kemes, and Dautheribes, 2000).
All of the “moral” values, identified on the “short list” are within the adjoining
value types of tradition, benevolence, conformity, security, and universalism
(Kinnier, Kemes, and Dautheribes, 2000, p. 4; Schwartz, 1994). None of the
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“moral” values is found within the spatial boundaries of the neighboring power,
achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction value types that lay
opposite the other, apparently, moral value types (Kinnier, Kemes, and
Dautheribes, 2000, p. 4; Schwartz, 1994).
Himmelfarb (2001), in an analysis of the cultural divide apparent within
early twenty-first century America, noted that what we now commonly refer to as
values were formerly called virtues (Wilson, 1997). She asked whether “moral
progress” can march forward alongside “material progress” or whether, as it now
appears, there may be some inverse relationship dictating moral decline (changing
value orientation) as society advances economically (Himmelfarb, 2001, p. 26-27).
Himmelfarb (2001, p. 37) decried the currently fashionable “ethical and cultural
relativism that reduces all values (and) standards.”
Some researchers (Claxton, Murray, and Janda, 1995; Rindfleisch,
Burroughs, and Denton, 1997) have explored negative correlations between family
stability and materialism and some (Bengston, 1975; Easterlin and Crimmins,
1991) have turned their attention to links between family structure and values
orientations. Himmelfarb (2001, p. 45) described the family as “the seedbed of
virtue” and speculated that the breakdown of the family in the twentieth-century
western world may be closely associated, not only with rising materialism, but,
with the concurrent values shifts of the ‘Great Disruption’ that marked the late
1960’s and early 1970’s.
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As a result of recent research, testing a second instrument for measuring
values priorities, Schwartz, et al (2001, p. 523) concluded “although people differ
substantially in the importance they attribute to values—values are organized by a
common structure of motivational oppositions and congruities for most literate
adults across cultures.” He has further found that “value priorities, measured with”
the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS), “have shown systematic, meaningful, and
predictable relations with numerous attitudes, personality traits, behaviors, and
background variables” in all the various cultures and regions studied (Schwartz, et
al, 2001, p.523).
Early Links Between Materialism and Values
The common definitions of materialism establish strong links between the
concept and human values or value systems. Materialism is a “doctrine that only
the highest values or objectives lie in material well-being” (Costello, 1996, p. 836).
Materialism is a “theory or doctrine that. . .worldly possessions constitute the
greatest good and highest value” (Abate, 1999, p. 812). Materialism is a
“preoccupation with or stress upon material rather than spiritual or intellectual
things” (Costello, 1996, p. 836).
The ancient religious traditions see materialistic behavior or attitudes within
the context of human virtue or values orientation. “Restraint is good in all things.
Even the gods will praise on who, though he receives little, does not despise what
he has received. He who (is). . .immoderate in his desires, the tempter will certainly
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overthrow him” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 90). “What the superior man seeks is in
himself. What the inferior man seeks is (without)” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 136).
Materiality is “vanity and striving after wind. . .it is madness. . .what does it
accomplish” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 233). “The love of money. (It) is a root of all
sorts of evil, and some by longing for it have wandered away. . .and pierced
themselves with many griefs” (Van Voorst, 2000, p. 282).
In the early 1800’s, de Tocqueville, observed an early American trend
toward materialistic pursuits, but perceived that it was balanced by other,
competing and, more spiritual, intellectual, or political gratifications. T.J. Jackson
Lears (1983, p. 3), writing about the America of the early 20th century, saw a “new
set of values” built on a wave of “compulsive spending.” He believed the new
values were replacing an earlier, alternative value system built around Victorian
mores. Lears (1983, p. 120) also believed that Robert S. Lynd, in his Middletown
research, discovered materialistic values were displacing “old-fashioned values”.
David Horowitz (1985, p. 150) observed that by 1940, Americans were seeking
meaning and “happiness through commercial goods and experiences.”
Modern Era Research on Materialism and Values
A stream of academic research on consumer materialism began in the
1950’s with the observation that the quest for material goods tends to crowd out
other, more selfless, pursuits (Heilbroner, 1956). Schneider (1917, p. 151)
proposed “establishing and relating types of values” when he identified six possible
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categories including “economic” values. A very similar categorization of values
was proposed by Allport, Vernon, and Lindzey (1960) when they described persons
who value consumption and wealth accumulation as those with strong economic
values. One paradigm for the classification of human values included two
independent bipolar dimensions, one of which is described as
“materialism/humanism” (Bengston and Lovejoy, 1973, p. 892). The specific
materialism values were identified as “finances, possessions, appearance, and
respect,” while the humanism values were “service, equality, peace, and ethical
life” (Bengston and Lovejoy, 1973, p. 890). Bredemeier and Toby (1963)
suggested that consumer materialism could drive out other, competing, values and
lead to a state of religious and political apathy in society. Bengston and Lovejoy
(1973) theorized that the concepts of humanism and materialism were opposing,
bipolar, ends of a single-factor value system. Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-
Halton (1978) believed that the desire to be envied, or social status, is a life goal, or
value, that engenders some materialistic behavior. Uusitalo (1980, p. 15)
recognized a motivational connection, when he alluded to the “values of
materialism.” One researcher perceived a correlation between encroaching
American materialism and the values shift away from more altruistic concerns
(Wachtel, 1983). The concept of the “voluntary simplicity” lifestyle (perhaps a
near opposite of materialism) was believed to be closely associated with
environmental and personal growth values (Shama and Wisenblit, 1984).
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Materialism has long been associated with values or even identified as a
value or value system. Fox and Lears (1983, p. x) described America’s nineteenth
century “producer ethic” as a “value system based on work, sacrifice, and saving”
and then asked whether that value system had given way to a 20th century one
based on a “consumer ethic.” Belk (1985), and others, associated conspicuous
consumption with material values. A popular consumer behavior text (Engel,
Blackwell, and Miniard, 1995) analyzed all consumer behavior, including
materialism, within the motivational context of human values and value systems.
While not all researchers share the Richins and Dawson (1992) view of materialism
as a value, some perceive a close relationship between materialism and either
individual values or value orientations.
Belk (1985) held that materialistic behavior is generally irreconcilable with
spiritual or traditional values. Rochberg-Halton (1986) believed materialistic
values are associated with other self-seeking ones and are in conflict with
communal human values. Easterlin and Crimmins (1991, p. 499) cited changing
“value orientations” as the primary cause of a shift toward materialistic pursuits
and away from other goals in life. Richins and Dawson (1992) recognized the
intertwining nature of materialistic behavior and human values orientations. They
centered much of their research on the Rokeach (1973) conception of values and
actually proposed, “defining materialism as a value” (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p.
308). “Materialists tend to judge their own and others’ success by the number and
quality of possessions accumulated” (Richins and Dawson, 1992, p. 331).
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Materialists also develop an inordinate concern for the ways in which purchased
goods can contribute to an enhanced self-image and social status (Campbell, 1987;
Richins and Dawson, 1992; Richins, 1994).
Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 308) proposed that materialism is actually a
value, within the notion of values put forth by Rokeach (1973), and set about to
advance a measure of the “three belief domains described. . .acquisition centrality,
the role of acquisition in happiness, and the role of possessions in defining
success.” In the end, they developed and tested a scale consisting of eighteen
items, covering the three defining factors, and scored on a five-point Likert format
(Richins and Dawson, 1992; Richins, 1994).
Kasser and Ryan (1993) ignored the Richins and Dawson (1992) concept,
of materialism as a value, and subscribed instead to the earlier perception that
identified materialistic behavior as a consequence of a set of attitudes or beliefs
associated with particular life goals or values. They cited Deci and Ryan (1985) in
noting that concern for wealth and material goods, at some level of moderation,
may not be either positive or negative with regard to “adjustment and well-being,”
but that an excessive interest may exclude other, more well-adjusted, pursuits
(Kasser and Ryan, 1993, p. 410). Studying the effects of materialism, and
disproportionate concern for financial success, on healthy psychological
adjustment, Kasser and Ryan (1993) pointed to research on values by Rokeach
(1973), Braithwaite and Law (1985), and Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) that indicates
each person has some individual hierarchy of importance of human value domains
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or types. The Kasser and Ryan (1993) analysis points to the conclusion that if there
are ranked categories or domains of values and that if materialism is a value, or is
closely associated with certain values, then materialism may eventuate, in the
individual value hierarchy, to lessen, or even exclude altogether, other, opposing
values.
Attempts to find correlations between specific values or value types,
through factor analysis, have generally been unproductive yielding conflicting,
inconsistent results (Rokeach, 1973; Braithwaite and Law, 1985; Schwartz, 1992;
Braithwaite, 1994). In many cases, values that are conceived to be polar opposites
are found to have positive, not negative, correlations. Both Schwartz (1992) and
Braithwaite (1994) agree that, in practice, values are treated cognitively in a much
more complex fashion. They are seen as worthy, competing, but not necessarily
mutually exclusive, objectives. Mayton, Ball-Rokeach, and Loges (1994, p. 3)
concur with that view, observing that there is never an absence of values, but that
we “merely elevate (certain) ways of behaving. . .in importance relative” to others.
Schwartz (1992; 1994) was eventually successful in aggregating values into logical,
related types or categories by using smallest space analysis techniques to form ten
distinct two-dimensional groupings.
Two, or perhaps three, of the ten, value types identified by Schwartz (1994,
p. 21), power, achievement, and possibly security, include several specific values,
such as “successful,” “social recognition,” “ambitious,” “preserving public image,”
and “wealth” that have been closely associated with materialism. Three of the
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Schwartz (1994) value types, tradition, benevolence, and universalism, are opposite
the power and achievement categories in two-dimensional space and are thought to
have sharply contrasting, or competing, motivational roots. The value types of
tradition, benevolence, universalism, and possibly the adjoining conformity,
contain a number of specific values that have been associated with lack of
materialism or non-materialism. Some of them are “acceptance of portion in life,”
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“moderation,” self-discipline, spirituality,”“friendship, meaning in life,”
“world peace,” “self-discipline” and “environmental protection” (Schwartz, 1994,
p. 21).
Richins (1994, p. 523) examined the importance of material possessions to
persons either low or high in materialism and found the “type of possessions
valued” and the “private and public meanings of these possessions” to be aspects
that are associated with levels of materialism. Counter-intuitively, less
materialistic consumers were found to be more self-gratifying in their attitudes
toward possessions than those who are highly materialistic (Richins, 1994).
Richins (1994) also found those who are less materialistic were also found to
cherish possessions more for their symbolic value when those articles are closely
linked with personal relationships. Highly materialistic persons were found to
value possessions more for reasons of social status as well as for their utility
(Richins, 1994). Richins and Rudman (1994, p. 218) used the Richins and Dawson
(1992) materialism scale to investigate possible relationships with a number of
“specific economic variables.” They reported materialists are more likely to “view
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their possessions as indicators of. . .success in life,” than are persons who are less
materialistic (Richins and Rudman, 1994, p. 223). Interestingly, they also found
that materialistic persons “can be expected to work more or strive for higher paying
jobs” compared to persons with other values (Richins and Rudman, 1994, p. 224).
It had been speculated that materialistic persons “value work only as a way for
acquiring material goods,” while those who value the “work ethic” find intrinsic
worth in work itself and are sometimes “inspired to work more than is needed”
(Mullin, 1988, p. 423). The Richins and Rudman (1994) finding appears to
contradict earlier conventional wisdom.
Netemeyer, Burton, and Lichtenstein (1995) constructed an instrument
intended to measure vanity-related traits associated with consumer behavior.
Materialism was one of the chosen constructs, along with several others, believed
to be related to consumer vanity. In testing the instrument, it was found that
materialistic pursuits seem to be strongly associated with personal achievement
motivations (Netemeyer, Burton, and Lichtenstein, 1995). That finding supported
the earlier conclusion by Richins and Dawson (1992) that possessions, as symbols
of success, are a defining characteristic of materialism.
Richins (1995) returned to the subject of materialism with a study of the
impacts of advertising on social comparison. Social comparison theory posits that
people make social choices in the context of comparisons with other people.
Humans use social comparison with a peer group to determine whether they fit in,
or are normal, and also to help establish hierarchical social standing. People
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employ all manner of criteria for social comparison, but generally tend to favor
objective rather than subjective standards (Richins, 1995). In the American
consumer culture, material possessions have assumed particular importance in
social comparison to determine self worth (Belk, 1988; Dittmar, 1992). Persons
who are highly materialistic may make comparisons of their possessions or
consumer experiences with those of others and consequently attempt to acquire
more in an effort to elevate their self worth. Those who are not materialistic tend
not to gauge self-image by their possessions and will therefore be predisposed to be
more content with their current standard of living (Richins, 1995). Those, less
materialistic, persons may be more inclined to accept life as it is.
Holt (1995, p.14) extended the investigation of consumers varied
motivations and behaviors by asking “What do people do when they consume?” It
was proposed that a particular object could be purchased and used in a multitude of
varying ways depending on the motivations of the consumer. In any case Holt
(1995) agreed with Richins (1995) that consumption could be seen as a social
activity. Holt (1995, p. 12) described materialism as either a “trait or value that
measures the importance of possessions in one’s life.” Possessions are sometimes
important, not just to those with much, but also, to those with relatively little of
life’s material goods. Consequently, the manner in which people consume may
provide a better measure of materialism, than does the level of importance one
places on belongings. Holt (1995) asked whether the measurement of perceived
value in consumption itself might be more appropriate to the study of materialism
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than the observation of attitudes about the importance of the objects. In some
cases, persons of meager possessions place high value on the little they have. Holt
(1995) also questioned the proposition, put forth earlier by Richins and Dawson
(1992), that voluntary simplicity, or being content with little in the way of material
goods, is the polar opposite of materialism. Non-materialists may place value in
spiritual or intellectual experiences and in other persons, while materialists find
value in physical possessions, without regard to the quantity or market value of
those belongings. Those who are not materialistic may perceive objects as having
only transactional value, i.e. means to find value elsewhere, either in experiences,
relationships, or altruistic goals. Materialists therefore tend to see possessions as
ends in themselves and/or as means to enhance self-image or social standing (Holt,
1995). Holt (1995), as is his custom, assumes a singularly unique perspective on
the possible motivations for varying categories and degrees of materialistic
behavior, but fails to obviate the concept that there is an association between
materialism and values, or personal values orientation.
Another group of researchers found that materialistic pursuits are strongly
associated with personal achievement motivations and that possessions are
considered by materialists to be symbols of success (Netemeyer, Burton, and
Lichtenstein, 1995). Others have also proposed that materialistic consumers use
possessions for social comparison and to assess self-worth (Belk, 1988; Dittmar,
1992). Richins (1995) found, conversely, that less materialistic persons are more
content with their current standard of living and tend to accept life as it is. Non-
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materialists may place value in spiritual or intellectual experiences and in other
persons (Holt, 1995). Belk, Dholakia, and Venkatesh (1996) proposed that there is
some set of material values, or life goals, that lead some persons to seek fulfillment
through possessions.
Chatterjee and Hunt (1996) searched for a connection between the trait of
materialism and the personality dimension of self-monitoring. Self-monitoring is a
measure of the extent to which people feel driven or motivated to scrutinize their
own appearance and behavior for social acceptability. Persons who are strong self-
monitors feel compelled to modify or adapt their presentation to fit their perception
of the social norm. It was supposed there may be a correlation between
materialism and self-monitoring (Chatterjee and Hunt, 1996). Utilizing the Richins
and Dawson (1992) materialism survey and a self—monitoring scale developed by
Snyder (1974), a “large association (between) scores on the success and centrality
subscales” of the materialism survey and self-monitoring was found, while the
“happiness” subscale “contributed little” to the model (Chatterjee and Hunt, 1996,
p. 527). Two of the three materialism constructs found by Richins and Dawson
(1992) are apparently closely related to self-monitoring behavior (Chatterjee and
Hunt, 1996).
Belk, Dholakia, and Venkatesh (1996, p. 219) examined the phenomenon of
voluntary simplicity and concluded various “people and cultures (hold) different
combinations of material and nonmaterial values.” This view of a materialistic
values orientation is somewhat different than the earlier propositions of Holt
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(1995), but more consistent with the wider body of research (Shama and Widenblit,
1984; Rassuli and Hollander, 1986; Cushman, 1990; Easterlin and Crimmins, 1991;
Richins and Dawson, 1992; Kasser and Ryan, 1993). Those who choose to live
with fewer material possessions may find life’s satisfactions through the pursuit of
some combination of non-materialistic values, while there is apparently some set of
material values, or life goals, that lead others to seek fulfillment through
possessions and wealth (Belk, Dholakia, and Venkatesh, 1996). Materialism is
even sometimes referred to in the literature as one aspect of the “negative side, or
dark side of consumer behavior” (Mick, 1996, p. 106). Belk (1983, p. 514) had
discussed religious and ethical tradition and the implication that “humans feel a
powerful attraction to acquisitiveness but a profound disenchantment with its
results.”
Browne and Kaldenberg (1997) also researched the links between
materialism and self-monitoring along with the added factor of clothing
involvement. Persons who are low self-monitors govern their public appearance
and actions based on internal motivations or values rather than cues from others.
Browne and Kaldenberg (1997, p. 32) described materialism as “a cluster of related
traits, attitudes, and values focusing on possessions and guiding the selection of
events and things.” They also noted the negative connotations generally associated
with materialism, i.e. greed, covetousness, and lack of charitability (Browne and
Kaldenberg, 1997). Using the Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism survey,
Browne and Kaldenberg (1997) found significant correlations between self-
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monitoring scores and materialism. Unlike Chatterjee and Hunt (1996), Browne
and Kaldenberg (1997) discovered positive relationships with all three materialism
subscales of the Richins and Dawson (1992) formulation, success, centrality, and
happiness. There also appears to be a gender gap, with men registering, in the
Browne and Kaldenberg (1997) results, as somewhat more materialistic than
women. As expected, they also found materialism to be positively related to the
concept of product involvement (Browne and Kaldenberg, 1997).
La Barbera and Gurhan (1997, p. 72) investigated possible links between
consumers’ “materialistic attitudes” and “religiosity.” The researchers identified
materialism as a “secular value” and religiosity was defined as a “sacred value” (La
Barbera, 1997, p. 74). It was reported that those who are low in religiosity are
more likely to be materialistic and suggested that “marketers might benefit from
considering consumer religiosity as a segmentation” variable (La Barbera, 1997, p.
92).
Mick (1996) attempted to replicate earlier research by Richins and Dawson
(1992) concerning whether Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) significantly
affects survey results for materialism as well as several other consumer behavior
variables. Contrary to the earlier findings, in two distinct studies utilizing the
Materialism Survey and two different measures of SDR he found “respondents
appeared to underreport their materialism” to a significant extent (Mick, 1996, p.
116). Despite the established SDR effects, Mick (1996, p. 116) concluded “the
impact of SDR on understanding relationships between materialism and its
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consequences (on several other studied consumer and personality variables) was
neither dramatic nor comprehensive.”
Rindfleisch, Burroughs, and Denton (1997) investigated possible
relationships between the related concepts of materialism and compulsive
consumption and the demographic variable of family structure. The inquiry
focused on whether a history of parental divorce or separation subsequently
affected the materialistic or compulsive consumption tendencies of young adults.
The compulsive consumption construct was adopted from O’Guinn and Faber
(1989, p. 147) and defined as a “response to an uncontrollable drive or desire to
obtain, use, or experience.” Compulsive consumption is found among buyers who
are looking for “increased self-esteem from their purchases (rather) than economic
or utilitarian value” (Rindfleisch, Burroughs, and Denton, 1997, p. 314). Using the
Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism survey, it was reported that subjects from
broken families are significantly more materialistic and compulsive in their buying
practices (Rindfleisch, Burroughs, and Denton, 1997).
Ger and Belk (1996) investigated possible cultural and demographic
differences in materialism across samples of consumers from 12 countries, using
the Belk (1985) materialism scales. Contrary to some earlier reports, they found no
predictable pattern of cultural differences among the twelve countries and
concluded that materialism is not “unique to the west nor directly related to
affluence” (Ger and Belk, 1996, p. 72). Eastman, Fredenberger, Campbell, and
Calvert (1997), however, found significant cultural and national differences in
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materialism, across samples from three countries (USA, China, and Mexico), using
the Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism scale. However, it was reported that
there are no “significant differences in the level of status consumption” for the
consumers surveyed in the three countries (Eastman, 1997, p. 61). Status
consumption and materialism were found to be “significantly different constructs in
all three countries” (Eastman, 1997, p. 63).
Sirgy (1998, p. 227) posited a “theory of materialism and quality of life” as
he revisited the question of correlations between materialistic behavior or attitudes
and social comparison. He observed that “quality of life” and “standard of living”
expectations among the materialistic are set by social comparison and may lead to
the negative emotions or traits of “envy, jealousy, feelings of inequity,” and even
“anger” (Sirgy, 1998, p. 229). One point of particular interest is Sirgy’s (1998)
observation that materialists not only have a proclivity to over-consume, but also to
under-produce, which is contrary to the Richins and Rudman (1994) findings.
Muncy and Eastman (1998) investigated the question of whether
materialistic consumers are burdened with diminished ethical standards relative to
persons who are less consumption oriented. The psychological, moral,
environmental, and social ills that have been charged to materialism might lead to
the logical proposition that there is a link between materialism and ethical
principles. It was found that, despite all the negative implications of materialism,
the existing body of research provided “little empirical evidence that answers the
following question: do people who are more materialistic have different ethical
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standards than those who are less materialistic” (Muncy and Eastman, 1998, p.
139). Utilizing the Richins and Dawson (1992) Materialism Survey and the Muncy
and Vitell (1992) consumer ethics scale they found a “strong and consistent
relationship between all of the dimensions of the materialism scale and all of the
dimensions of the ethics scale” (Muncy and Eastman, 1998, p. 141). The
consumer ethics scale (Muncy and Vitell, 1992) measures four dimensions of
unethical consumer activities described as either “proactively” or “passively
benefiting” by taking unfair financial advantage to the detriment of the seller,
engaging in “deceptive practices,” and “no harm, no foul” which refers to unethical
practices that are rationalized as being of inconsequential harm to the seller (Muncy
and Eastman, 1998, p. 139). All of the unethical practices were strongly correlated
to an elevated level of materialism. Causality of the correlation between the
concepts of materialism and consumer ethics was not determined.
Earlier studies theorized a negative relationship between materialism and
religiosity, and some have found religiosity to be positively related to higher
standards of ethics (Du Bois, 1955; Belk, 1985, Foumier and Richins, 1991; La
Barbera and Gurhan, 1997). However, the causational questions of whether
diminished ethical standards may bring about materialism or vice versa or whether
both may be triggered by other factors such as diminishing religiosity or broken
family structure are posed, but not persuasively answered in the literature (Muncy
and Eastman, 1998). Muncy and Eastman (1998, p. 142) noted their supposition
that it is possible, or even likely, that there is “reciprocal causality” between
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materialism and lower ethical standards. In keeping with other consumer research,
Muncy and Eastman (1998, p. 138) pr0pose that the “acquisition of material
possessions is a natural, healthy part of one’s life. However, beyond a certain
point, the quest for material possessions may begin to interfere with other important
aspects of life.” When opposing values are in conflict, those that are less important
to the individual give way to those that are obsessions, like materialism.
Beutel and Marini (1998, p. 438) proposed a three-factor measure of values
orientation that defined one of the factors as “materialism—the emphasis on
personal material benefit and competition.” They also theorized “those who attach
importance to finding purpose and meaning life also tend to attach importance to
the public interest but not to materialism (Beutel and Marini, 1998, p. 43 8). Roccas
and Schwartz (1997, p. 357) observed, “the primary aim of religion is to temper
materialist tendencies and to encourage transcendence.” They hypothesized that
materialism may be closely associated with value groupings that conflict with
religiosity and may be opposed to those that are associated with religious values
(Roccas and Schwartz, 1997).
Muncy and Eastman (1998) investigated possible associations between ethical
consumer behavior and materialistic tendencies. They found consistent correlation
between unethical practices and elevated materialism (Muncy and Eastman, 1998).
Earlier studies theorized negative relationships between religiosity and materialism
and positive associations between religiosity and ethical behavior (Du Bois, 1955;
Belk, 1985; Foumier and Richins, 1991; La Barbera and Gurhan, 1997). Flouri
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(1999, pp. 719-720) confirmed, not only, that materialism is negatively related to
religiosity, but also that it is also negatively related to “satisfying interpersonal
relationships” and “feelings of self-worth.”
Sharpe and Ramanaiah (1999) revisited the subject of possible correlations
between various personality traits and materialism. Materialism has been
demonstrated to be negatively associated with internal locus of control, the need for
uniqueness, and subjective well-being (Hunt, Keman, Chatterjee, and Florscheim,
1990; Schroeder and Dugal, 1995; La Barbera and Gurhan, 1997). Materialism has
also been positively related to consumer susceptibility to interpersonal influence,
public self-consciousness, and social anxiety (Schroeder and Dugal, 1995). Sharpe
and Ramanaiah (1999) concluded there is a need to identify a comprehensive
personality profile of the materialistic person. The Belk (1984) materialism scale
and the NEO Five Factor Inventory of personality traits were used to measure the
behaviors associated with neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and
conscientiousness (Sharpe and Ramanaiah, 1999). Materialists were found to be
significantly “more neurotic and less extraverted, open, agreeable, and
conscientious” than those with low materialism scores (Sharpe and Ramanaiah,
1999,p.329)
Twitchell (1999) reviewed nearly a century of popular and academic
criticism of the negative consequences of the excesses of materialism before
proffering an alternative, more positive, viewpoint. He believed it important to
acknowledge the widespread, modern Western perspective that a high level of
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societal consumption “is a vital source of meaning and happiness in the modern
world” (Twitchell, 1999, p. 16). However, following a protracted peroration on the
societal and personal benefits of the pursuit of material goods, Twitchell (1999, p.
21) conceded he had “glossed over” many of the ills, both for the individual and
society, associated with materialism. He acknowledged that “getting and spending
has eclipsed family, ethnicity, and even religion as a defining matrix” of the
modern western world (Twitchell, 1999, p. 23).
Flouri (1999, p. 707) examined various possible factors, including “peer
,, “
influence, maternal materialism,” parent-child relationships, and “religious
service attendance” for their effects on materialism. Using Richins and Dawson’s
(1992) Materialism Scale, along with several other instruments and demographic
data, the results showed positive correlations between adolescent materialism and
maternal materialism and susceptibility to interpersonal influence (Flouri, 1999).
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Materialism is, however, negatively related to “religiosity, parental guidance on
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money management, satisfying interpersonal relationships,” and “feelings of self-
worth” Flouri (1999, pp. 719-720). N0 relationship between materialism and
disadvantaged socio-economic circumstances was identified. Flouri (1999, p. 721,
722) utilized the Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism scale, but contended the
issue of whether materialism is itself a value “has not been fully resolved.”
“Materialistic values” are referred to synonymously with the term materialism
(Flouri, 1999, p. 722).
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Another investigation centered on the possibility of using the individual
“value system” as a method of typing or segmenting consumers (Kwon, 1999, p.
232). Based on a factor analysis of 45 “lifestyle and value items,” six factors were
discovered (Kwon, 1999, p. 239). The researcher labeled one of the identified
value systems, or orientations, comprised of several clustered values items, as
“materialism” (Kwon, 1999, p. 244).
Lundstrom and White (1999) investigated the possible generational and
cultural differences in levels of consumer materialism. It was reported that
materialism seems to “have become more prevalent as the means of acquisition”
have increased (Lundstrom, 1999, p. 51). The two-country (USA and France)
study confirmed earlier reported generational differences in materialism, with
materialism rising through middle age, and then declining (Lundstrom, 1999). It
was also reported that consumers from the United States are generally more
materialistic than French consumers (Lundstrom, 1999).
Csikszentmihalyi (2000) recalled that Arendt (1958) concluded at mid-
century that personal consumption had moved far beyond acquisition of the
necessities of life and into a quest for extravagance. Some recent researchers have
found that although materialistic behavior may be employed in the pursuit of
happiness, it apparently makes no significant contribution to the desired
consequence (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Diener 2000; Myers, 2000). “Contrary to
popular opinion, things that can be bought do not enhance happiness by much”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, 270). In fact, quite to the contrary, it has been found that
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“excessive concern with financial success and material values is associated with
lower levels of life satisfaction and self-esteem” (Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 270).
The disjuncture, between the pursuit of happiness through materialism and the lack
of resulting happiness, is attributed to the unwarranted search for “contingent
worth” (Kasser and Ryan, 1993, p. 416). Csikszentmihalyi (2000, p. 270) wrote
that the concept of “contingent worth” is “predicated on having rather being.”
Materialistic behavior is expressed as indicative of the “vain hope that we can
achieve happiness through consumption—regardless of the consequences”
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 272). Csikszentmihalyi (2000, p. 270) did not refer to
materialism itself as a value, but rather to the “material values.”
Clark (2000, p. 47) observed some apparent conflicts in the literature on
materialism. Some researchers, such as Inglehart (1981) find that post-materialism,
or non-materialistic, values, such as those related to life “goals like democracy,
love, or intellectual satisfaction,” are on the rise (Clark, 2000, p. 47). Other, more
recent studies, such as Easterlin and Crimmins (1991), find that materialism
continues to “rise sharply” and that the post-materialistic values “have either
declined slightly or hardly changed” (Clark, 2000, p. 47). Inglehart (1981), as a
political scientist, looked at public priorities on the theoretical materialism — post-
materialism continuum, while Easterlin and Crimmins (1991) investigated private
behavior in their review of levels of materialism. Both may be right; there is not
necessarily a contradiction in the findings. “What we want individually is not
always what we want collectively” (Clark, 2000, p. 48). It may be entirely correct
96
that young people in the economically advanced countries desire more personal
wealth and material possessions while also favoring government programs targeted
at post-materialistic social agendas. Individuals can hold to, and espouse or even
attempt to actualize, opposing, or sometimes conflicting, goals or values (Schwartz,
1992).
Saunders (2001, p. 191) confirms the “twentieth century is arguably most
notable for a global rise in consumerism.” The remarkable swing toward
materialism is “associated with a dramatic shift in values both within, and across,
cultures” (Saunders, 2001, p. 191). The twin phenomena of materialism and
shifting values is linked, by Saunders (2001, p. 192) to the search by contemporary
consumers for “personal identity and (social) status” through the vehicle of
“conspicuous possessions,” rather than from goals founded on more “intrinsic
characteristics.” People apparently presume that possessions signify “success,” but
the resulting veil of success does not, in turn, result in “self-respect” (Saunders,
2001, p. 195). Despite the failure to find self-respect in material gain, people
continue to “crave for. . .status and prestige. They yearn to move up the pecking
order” (Bloom, 1995, p. 252).
Terry Nichols Clark (2000, p. 47) asks “is materialism rising in America?”
He notes the evidence is contradictory. Inglehart has found, since the 1970’s, that
Americans, and citizens of other industrialized nations, are growing “more
postmaterialistic (concerned with non—material goals like democracy, love, or
intellectual satisfaction)” (Clark, 2000, p. 47). Conversely, Richard Easterlin and
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Eileen Crimmins, analyzing data from surveys very similar to those used by
Inglehart, find that “materialism has risen sharply since the 1960’s among” young
Americans (Clark, 2000, p. 47). They have found that non-materialistic concerns,
such as “family life, personal self-fulfillment and serving the public interest” have
either remained static or declined slightly since the late 1960’s (Clark, 2000, p.47).
Easterlin and Crimmins contend that a “consumer culture has grown, promoting
demand for consumer luxuries and money to buy them” (Clark, 2000, p. 47).
Clark (2000) believes the apparent contradictions between the findings of
Inglehart and those of Easterlin and Crimmins can be resolved. He contends that
the younger generations of industrialized nations are becoming more materialistic
,3 “
at a personal level, aspiring to own “at least two cars, clothes in the latest style,”
,9 “
Major labor-saving appliances, a high-quality stereo,” and a “vacation house,”
while also becoming increasingly postmaterialistic in their social goals (Clark,
2000, p. 48). Inglehart may be correct that younger generations are more
concerned with social goals such as gender equality, more government regulation
of environmental affairs, and greater workplace democracy (Clark, 2000).
One researcher has begun exploring possible “relationships between human
values and consumer” purchase preferences (Allen, 2001, p. 102). Michael W.
Allen (2001, p. 107) constructed a consumer survey “using the Schwartz value
domains as a guide” to measure correlations between value subscale scores and
consumer preferences for various attributes associated with automobiles. Most of
the Allen findings were relatively predictable. For example, consumers who highly
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value Universalism, or individual values such as “protecting the environment,”
9, “
“unity with nature, world beauty,” and “social justice” tend not prefer “large
automobiles” with “fast engines” (Allen, 2001, p. 117). And persons who highly
value Security, a domain that includes specific values such as “family security,”
“healthiness,” and “social order” tend to prefer automobiles that have perceived
“safety” and “reliability” attributes (Allen, 2001, p. 117).
Summary of Chapter II
Both the concept of materialism and the concept of unique human values
orientations have been popular themes of both secular and theological literature
throughout the last few thousand years. Modern researchers, particularly over the
last century, have also found reason to increasingly investigate each concept.
Marsha Richins (1987; 1990; 1994; Richins and Dawson, 1992) followed
the groundbreaking research of Russell Belk (1983, 1984, 1985) to become the
leading researcher in the field of consumer materialism over the last decade or
more. The Materialism Survey she developed together with Dawson (Richins and
Dawson, 1992) quickly became the most widely accepted instrument in social
science research for the measurement of materialistic attitudes and behavior
(Richins, 1994; Richins and Rudman, 1994).
Almost concurrently, Shalom Schwartz followed the earlier seminal values
research of Milton Rokeach (1960, 1968-69, 1973) to become the foremost
investigator in the field of human values (Roccas and Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz,
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1990, 1992, 1994; Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz and Huismans, 1995;
Schwatz, Melech, Lehman, Burgess, Harris, and Owens, 2001). Schwartz ‘
conception and definition of the relationships between various human values and
value types within a two-dimensional space is a truly groundbreaking development
and may eventually be viewed as a very early and critical step in the understanding
human values.
Possible links between certain values orientations and materialistic or non-
materialistic attitudes and behaviors have also long been common notions in the
popular literature and, although not specifically researched, have been frequently
mentioned in the academic literature of the last century. The developments of
accepted measures of both materialism (Richins and Dawson, 1992) and human
values orientations (Schwartz, 1992, 1994) have made investigation of potential





Widely tested and utilized written survey instruments, designed to measure
both materialism and values orientations have been developed over the last thirty
years (Rokeach, 1973; Belk, 1984). In each case there has been a widely accepted
instrument established within the research community and each of them has been
supplanted by a successor instrument within the last decade (Schwartz, 1990; 1992;
1994; Richins and Dawson, 1992). Both established instruments will be combined
in a single survey to gather data to statistically test the propositions that clusters of
values are related to individual levels of materialism.
Values Survey Instruments
The two most widely accepted instruments used for values measurement are
the Rokeach (1973) values survey and it’s direct descendant, the Schwartz (1990;
1992; 1994) values survey (SVS). Although the Rokeach (1973) instrument is still
utilized (Johnston, 1995; McCarty and Shrum, 2000), the Schwartz (1994)
instrument has quickly gained widespread academic recognition and use
(Braithwaite, 1994; Schwartz and Huismans, 1995; Roccas and Schwartz, 1997;
Schultz and Zelensky, 1998; Stem, Dietz, and Guagnano, 1998; Boehnke,
Stromberg, Regmi, Richmond, and Chandra, 1998; Schwartz, et al, 2001).
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Extensive research conducted with the Schwartz (1990; 1992; 1994) survey of
values has yielded a repeatedly tested, broadly acknowledged, and relatively
complete model of the universal, cross-cultural, structure of the human value
system (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1990; Schwartz, 1990; 1992; 1994; Schwartz and
Huismans, 1995; Roccas and Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz, et al, 2001). The
Schwartz (1994) values survey (SVS) be incorporated and used to measure
subject’s values orientations.
Materialism Survey Instruments
The Belk (1984; 1985) materialism survey was the first widely utilized and
accepted measure of consumer materialism, and it is still employed by some
researchers (Richins, 1987; Richins and Dawson, 1992; Sharpe and Ramanaiah,
1999). However, the generally accepted successor to the Belk instrument is the
Richins and Dawson (1992) materialism survey (Muncy and Vitell, 1992;
Chatterjee and Hunt, 1996; Flouri, 1999). Although there is not universal
agreement, with Richins and Dawson’s (1992) premise, that materialism is a value
(Kasser and Ryan, 1993; Schwartz, 1994; Holt, 1995), the Richins and Dawson
(1992) materialism survey is, nevertheless, an apparently reliable measure of the
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors generally thought to characterize the consumer
materialism construct (Richins, 1994; 1995; Holt, 1995; Mick, 1996; Rindfleisch,
Burroughs, and Denton, 1997; Muncy and Eastman, 1998). The Richins and
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Dawson (1992) materialism survey (RDMS) will be incorporated and utilized to
measure each subjects’ level of materialism.
Recent researchers, in the field of materialism, using either the Belk (1973)
or Richins and Dawson (1992) instruments, have employed very similar statistical
analysis methodologies to establish patterns in relationships between materialism,
and other factors of interest. Chatterjee and Hunt (1996) used simple linear
regression to establish relationships between materialism, as measured by the
RDMS, and various personality traits. Sharpe and Ramanaiah (1999, p. 329)
conducted “univariate analyses of variance” to establish any relationship between
materialism and personality characteristics. Similar techniques have been
employed to assess relationships between RDMS scores and socially desirable
responding measures (Mick, 1996). Regression analysis has been utilized to
evaluate links between product involvement, self-monitoring behavior and RDMS
materialism scores (Browne and Kaldenberg, 1997). Rindfleisch, Burroughs, and
Denton (1997) also used simple correlations to assess relationships between
materialism, compulsive consumption, and family structure. Flouri (1999, 715)
also used “simple standard regressions” to study connections between family
structure and materialism. A “simple bivariate correlational analysis between the
three dimensions” of RDMS and the “four dimensions of (a) consumer ethics
scale,” was conducted by Muncy and Eastman (1998, p. 141) to determine if
“specific relationships” existed.
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In some cases, values research has followed the Schwartz (1994) pattern of
using similarity structure analysis (SSA), formerly called smallest space analysis,
to evaluate relationships between values and other variables (Bilsky and Schwartz,
1994). Bilsky and Schwartz (1994) had some success employing SSA to establish
relationships between personality traits and values. In other instances, simple
linear regression has been utilized to evaluate relationships between religiosity and
SVS orientations (Schwartz and Huismans, 1995; Roccas and Schwartz, 1997).
Schultz and Zelezny (1998, p. 551) used a “series of multiple regression analyses”
to evaluate pro-environmental behavior compared to SVS values orientations.
Questionnaire and Sample
Although no demographic variables are critical to testing the proposed
hypotheses, there are many that could be of general interest and might aid in the
interpretation of the data. The comprehensive questionnaire administered to
subjects, including the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) and the Richins and Dawson
Materialism Survey (RDMS), also solicited basic demographic information, such as
gender, age, marital status, frequency of religious service attendance, education,
political affiliation, and place of residence. For the purpose of testing the
propositions stated by the six hypotheses, the questionnaire was administered to a
convenience sample of more than 100 adult subjects, age 18 and over, comprised of
adult college students and staff, and private sector business employees. The sample
includes 40 subjects residing in southeast Tennessee, but to provide for some
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regional diversity the balance of the sample was drawn randomly from throughout
the United States and from a few Americans residing in other countries, primarily
comprised of adult college students and their work associates. Those drawn from
Tennessee are primarily adult community college students and, in some cases, their
work associates or family members, and the balance were solicited primarily from
adult online university students located throughout the US. and a few working
outside the country. All those sampled were students in management and
leadership classes being taught by the researcher, or associates or family members
of those students. After discarding survey forms that were incomplete, data from
the remaining 97 fully completed questionnaires were included in the final
statistical analysis.
Proposed Statistical Analyses
The data collected for this study will be analyzed with typical statistical
calculations of means, averages, and range limitations. Principally the
demographic data, the materialism responses, and the rankings/ratings of the values
orientation responses will be analyzed with correlation calculations and with
regression analyses to search for correlations between various values, value types,
and value groups and levels of materialism and for models that may represent
combinations of values and value type rankings/ratings that may be predictive of
levels of materialism. Consultation with University of Tennessee-Knoxville
faculty members in the Statistics Department indicate that Similarity Space
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Analysis (SSA) techniques will not be helpful in assessing the hypotheses of this
study.
Summary of Chapter III
The Richins and Dawson Materialism Survey (RDMS) was combined with
the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS) and with questions soliciting various items of
demographic information to form a comprehensive questionnaire to collect written
survey responses. The questionnaire was designed to provide data for analyses
intended to test the propositions that there are two opposing clusters of human
values, one that is related to materialistic attitudes and behaviors, and another that
is related to non-materialistic tendencies (Richins and Dawson, 1992; Schwartz,
1992; 1994). Data was drawn from a convenience sample of adult college students
and their families and acquaintances. Surveyed students were enrolled in
leadership and management classes taught by the researcher at a small community




FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Introduction
Both correlation calculations and regression analyses provide statistical
evidence there is a cluster of values or value types, as hypothesized, that, when
given priority among the universe of human values, are associated with materialism
or materialistic attitudes and behavior. The companion proposition that there is an
opposing or competing cluster of values or value types, related to non-materialism,
is not strongly supported by the correlation calculations, but has some support from
the regression analyses of the data from this study. Taken collectively, there are
some inconclusive indications that there is an opposing cluster of non-materialistic
values, with weak correlations to materialism, which may warrant further research.
This seeming anomaly of competing, or opposing, values clusters that are
not negatively correlated may be explained by Schwartz’ (1992; 1994) earlier
finding that there essentially are no “negative” values. His research indicated that
all values, over all major human cultures, are essentially perceived as positive, with
varying degrees of preference. The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) asks
respondents to rank/rate values on a nine—point scale of —1 to 7 indicating that




Correlation coefficients and the associated p-values were computed for the
57 individual values, the ten value types, and the four value groupings, all as
measured by the Schwartz (1992; 1994) Values Survey (SVS), and for each of the
demographic variables versus materialism as measured by the Richins and Dawson
(1992) Materialism Survey (RDMS). Reliability calculations were also conducted
for all the aforementioned correlation computations. Calculations of means,
minimums, maximums, standard deviations, and frequencies were conducted for
each of the variables. Regression analyses, using principally the stepwise
procedure, were conducted for the 57 values, ten value types, and the four value
groups versus the factor of materialism.
Demographic Data
Corresponding roughly to the current college enrollment of adult students,
slightly more than 60 percent of the convenience sample was female. The average‘
age of the sampled group was between 36 and 37 years of age, with the youngest
being 18 and the oldest aged 79. The level of formal education of the sample
varied from the ninth grade to graduate students (Table 2). Nearly 25 percent of
those surveyed had achieved either a high school education or less, with most of
those just beginning college. About 60 percent had completed from one to three
years of college. The remaining fifteen (15) percent of those surveyed were college
graduates or had completed some graduate school education.
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Table 2: Years of Formal Education for Sample.
 
 
Years of Sample Percent Cumulative Cumulative
Education Frequency Frequency Percent
9 1 1 .03 1 1.03
1 1 1 1.03 2 2.06
12 22 22.68 24 24.74
13 18 18.56 42 43.30
14 27 27.84 69 71.13
15 13 13.40 82 84.54
16 6 6.19 88 90.72
17 1 1 .03 89 91.75
18 4 4.12 93 95.88
20 3 3 .09 96 98.97
21 1 1.03 97 100.00    
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The median educational level for the entire sample was 14 years, or the sophomore
year of college. Just under 60 percent of the surveyed persons were married, less
than 23 percent were single, just over ten percent divorced, and slightly more than
seven percent reported cohabiting. More than 80 percent of those sampled reported
being Protestants, about ten percent were Catholic, about three percent were
Jewish, and the balance reported “other” or “no” religious affiliation.
Of the demographic variables measured, only age was found to be
significantly correlated to materialism. Consistent with prior research (Belk, 1973;
Richins and Dawson, 1992; Richins, 1994; 1995 ; Chatterjee and Hunt, 1996;
Muncy and Eastman, 1998) materialism was found to be negatively correlated to
age (Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.20822, p = 0.0407). Some other
demographic variables have been found, in earlier research, to be correlated to
materialism, but probably due to the relatively small size of the current sample no
meaningful results were identified relating materialism to the various measured
demographic variables, with the exception of age (Richins, 1994; 1995). Earlier
researchers have also identified some correlations between various demographic
variables and certain individual values, but no effort was made to extend or verify
those areas of research (Schwartz and Huismans, 1995; Schwartz, et al, 2001).
Results of Correlations
In general, the group of propositions designated as Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and
1C, outlining the concept that a group or cluster of materialistic values is positively
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associated with materialistic attitudes and behavior was substantiated by the
analysis of the data. It was hypothesized (1A) that 12 individual values—sense of
belonging, social power, authority, wealth, preserving public image, social
recognition, ambition, success, influence, pleasure, self-indulgence, and enjoyment
of life—form a materialistic cluster and are each positively associated with
materialism. In fact, a cluster of 14 materialistic values, including 11 of the 12
designated values, was identified, each with a positive correlation to the factor of
materialism. The lists designated as Table 3 and Table 4 list all 15 individual
values that include the hypothesized materialistic cluster (Table 3) and the actual
materialism cluster (Table 4) identified by the analysis.
Of the 12 individual values hypothesized to be positively correlated to
materialism, 11 were demonstrated by the data from this sample to lie within a
cluster of materialistic values. The lone exception is “sense of belonging,” the sole
value from the security value type hypothesized to be related to materialism. Sense
of belonging was found to have no correlation to materialism, but cleanliness,
another adjoining security value was demonstrated to have a positive correlation to
materialism.
In addition, two of the three stimulation type values were also found to be
positively correlated to materialism. Excitement and daring are adjacent in the
two-dimensional values circle to the hedonism type and are contiguous with the
other identified materialism values, forming a related cluster (Figure 4).
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Table 3: Correlation Results for Hypothesized Materialism Cluster.
 




Sense of Belonging -0.01299 0.8995
Social Power 0.45483 <.0001
Authority 0.36436 0.0003
Wealth 0.49817 <.0001
Preserving Public Image 0.31468 0.0017










Table 4: Ranked Correlation Results for Identified Materialism Cluster.
 





Social Recognition 0.45570 <.0001




Preserving Public Image 0.31468 0.0017
Pleasure 0.31279 0.0018
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Figure 4: Values significantly and positively correlated to materialism.
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The 14 contiguous values demonstrated by the data from this sample to be
positively correlated to the factor of materialism and identified as the materialism
cluster are highlighted in Figure 4. They include all of the individual values found
within the power and hedonism value types, three of the five values found within
the achievement value type, two of the three values within the stimulation value
type, and one adjacent value, cleanliness, found within the security value type.
Hypothesis 1B proposed that the value types of power, achievement, and
hedonism are positively correlated with the phenomenon of materialism. The data
(Table 5) provide statistical support for that hypothesis and provide evidence that
the adjoining value type of stimulation is also positively correlated to materialism.
The first four value types listed in Table 4, power, stimulation, hedonism, and
achievement form an adjoining segment of value types (Figure 4) that appear to be
related to materialistic attitudes and behavior. Security and self-direction, the value
types that adjoin either side of the materialistic segment, may be weakly and
positively correlated to materialism, although the associated p-values are not within
a 0.05 standard.
Hypothesis 1C posited that the higher-order value grouping of self-
enhancement, containing 11 of the 12 value types hypothesized to be within a
materialism cluster, is positively correlated to materialism. The research findings,
based on this sample, support Hypothesis 1C, but also support the conclusion that
the adjoining higher-order grouping of openness to change, containing five
individual values found within the actual 14 value materialism cluster, is also
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Table 5: Correlation results for Value Types and Materialism.
 
   










Universalism -0. 13073 0.2018
Benevolence —0. 19299 0.0582
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positively correlated to materialism. The results of the correlation analyses
for the four value groupings are shown in Table 6.
The group of Hypotheses labeled 1A, 1B, and 1C, dealing with the various
levels of identification of a cluster of values thought to be related to materialism,
was generally supported by the analyses of correlations between materialism and
the 57 individual values, the ten value types, and the four value groupings.
The second group of Hypotheses (2A, 2B, and 2C), dealing with a proposed
group of non-materialistic values, is not generally supported by the data (Table 6).
Based on anecdotal and propositional evidence in the literature, 24 of the 57
individual values were hypothesized to be negatively related to materialism.
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Table 6: Correlation results for Value Groupings and Materialism.
   
Value Groupings Pearson Correlation p
Coefficient
Self-Enhancement 0.51892 <.0001





In fact, only one of those 24 values garnered significant statistical evidence to
support that hypothesis (Table 7). Social justice, one of the universalism type
values near the border with the benevolence type (Figure 5), appears from analysis
of the sample data to be negatively related to materialism. There are several
additional values found the in the same general region of the two-dimensional
values circle, beginning with honesty, helpfulness, and moderation, that indicate
some evidence of weak negative correlations with materialism but the associated p-
values do not fall within a 0.05 standard. However, in general, the notion that there
is an identifiable non-materialistic cluster of values, diametrically opposite the
cluster of materialistic values is not supported by the statistical analysis of
correlations from this sample.
Hypothesis 2B proposed that the value types of universalism, benevolence,
and tradition are negatively correlated with materialism. Results of the data
analyses dealing with this hypothesis are shown in Table 5. The benevolence and
universalism types show weak indication of negative correlation to materialism
with coefficients of —0. 193 and —0. 131, respectively, but only benevolence
approaches the p-value standard of 0.05 with a 0.058. The correlation calculation
results for the tradition type show no indication of support for the hypothesis.
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Values Pearson Correlation p
Coefficient
Social Justice -0.24682 0.0148
Honesty -0. 18374 0.0716
Helpfulness -0. 18369 0.0717
Moderation -0. 18243 0.0737
Inner Harmony -0. 16369 0.1091
Loyalty -0.15972 0.1181
World Peace -0. 14389 0.1597
Forgiving Nature -0. 12943 0.2064
Spirituality -0.11856 0.2681
World Beauty -0. 10559 0.3033
Protected Environment -0.09866 0.3363
Broadmindedness -0.09198 0.3702
Mature Love -0.09035 0.3788
True Friendship -0.07609 0.4588




Unity with Nature -0.03381 0.7423
Respect for Tradition -0.02399 0.8156
Humility -0.01948 0.8498
Wisdom -0.01690 0.8695
Accept Portion in Life 0.10080 0.3259
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Figure 5: Value significantly and negatively correlated to materialism.
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Hypothesis 2C dealt with the higher-order group of values, self-
transcendence, that lies opposite the materialistic self-enhancement group, within
the two-dimensional pie-shaped model of human values, which, based on the data
(Table 6), indicates a possible weak negative correlation to materialism (-0.18467).
However, with a p-value (0.0702) that is again greater than the 0.05 standard, the
evidence is far from conclusive. The data indicate no relationship between the
fourth value category, conservation, and materialism.
The standardized Cronbach coefficient alpha calculations of reliability, for
all the various constructs pertinent to the correlation analyses testing the hypotheses
and for conclusions concerning related value types and groups, generally yielded
results above, or very near, the accepted 0.70 standard, with the exception of the
tradition value type (Table 8).
Results of Regression Analyses
Despite the lack of statistical confirmation of a cluster of values with even a
weak negative correlation with materialism, the regression analyses of the sample
data provide strong evidence that the self-transcendence group of values, which is
wholly comprised of the benevolence and universalism value types, does, in
conjunction with the positive effects of the self-enhancement group, have a
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Figure 6: Materialism regression model at value group level.
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Table 9: Regression Model of Value Groups versus Materialism Variable.
Variable Parameter Standard Standard t Pr >
Estimate Estimate Error value It]
Intercept 2.16776 0 0.25246 8.59 <0.0001
Self— 0.44426 0.73934 0.04978 8.93 <0.0001
Enhancement
Self— -0.32561 -0.50644 0.05326 -6.11 <0.0001
Transcendence      
 R-Square = 0.4772, Adjusted R-Square = 0.4661
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Within the model, although the positive effects of the self-enhancement
values group is greater than the counterbalancing negative effects of the self-
transcendence values group, the two factors collectively create a robust model
defining the impacts of values group orientations on levels of materialism.
At the value type level, the stepwise procedure of regression analyses of the
data yields an almost equally robust model of the relationships of values types and
materialism with three of the ten value types (Figure 7) (Table 10). In this model,
power and hedonism, are the two value types with a positive relationship with
materialism, while the negative factor universalism, rather than benevolence, joins
the other two types to form a robust model of value types defining levels of
materialism. Again, although correlation calculations failed to yield convincing
evidence of a cluster of non-materialistic values, the regression models appear to
lend some credence to the notion of a materialism-related values model comprised
of two opposing clusters of values, one with positive relationships with materialism
and the other with negative, and somewhat less effectual, impacts. A five-factor
model including benevolence, as a negative factor, and the security value type, as a
positive factor, yields a slightly better adjusted R-square of 0.4796, but with one t-
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 Figure 7: Materialism regression model at the value type level.
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Table 10: Regression Model of Value Types versus Materialism Variable.
   
Variable Parameter Standard Standard t Pr >
Estimate Estimate Error value It]
Intercept 1.94963 0 0.18126 10.76 <0.0001
Power 0.20688 0.50548 0.03284 6.30 <0.0001
Hedonism 0.15793 0.37998 0.03750 4.21 <0.0001
Universalism -0. 19458 -0.40788 0.04099 —4.75 <0.0001  
 R-Square = 0.4752, Adjusted R-Square = 0.4583
128
 
Regression analyses, at the individual value level, indicate that either five or
six values comprise a reasonably robust model explaining variation in the
dependent variable materialism (Table 11, Table 12). In a model including only
the five most influential values (Table 11), three of them—wealth, social
recognition, and enjoyment of life, affect levels of materialism positively, while
two values, social justice and world peace, have a negative effect. In a somewhat
more robust model comprised of the six most influential values (Figure 8) (Table
12), based on regression analyses—social power, is added to the first five values.
In the larger value model, social power has a positive effect on materialism, adding
somewhat to the overall predictive power of the model, increasing the adjusted R—
Square from 0.4665 to 0.4855.
Summary of Chapter IV
Statistical data based on analyses of the data drawn from the convenience
sample for this study of 97 adult students and associates provides convincing
evidence of the existence of a cluster of values and value types that are related to
materialistic attitudes and behaviors. There is, however, only mixed statistical
support for the proposition that there is a contending or conflicting group of values
that moderate materialistic tendencies. The stepwise regression models for
materialism include both positive and negative values and value types, but




Table 11: Regression Model of Five Values versus Materialism Variable.
 
Variable Parameter Standard Standard t Pr >
Estimate Estimate Error value |t|
Intercept 1.87483 0 0.18649 10.05 <0.0001
Wealth 0.11871 0.34567 0.02841 4.18 <0.0001
Social Justice -0.08184 -0.24188 0.02970 -2.76 0.0071
Social 0.10416 0.33056 0.02670 3.90 0.0002
Recognition
Enjoyment of 0.09988 0.25644 0.03167 3.15 0.0022
Life
World Peace -0.06821 -0.22296 0.02824 -2.42 0.0177     




Table 12: Regression Model of Six Values versus Materialism Variable.
 
Variable Parameter Standard Standard t Pr >
Estimate Estimate Error value |t|
Intercept 1.86527 0 0.18319 10.18 <0.0001
Wealth 0.09253 0.26942 0.03058 3.03 0.0032
Social Justice -0.08194 —0.24216 0.02917 -2.81 0.0061
Social 0.09498 0.30144 0.02658 3.57 0.0006
Recognition
Enjoyment of 0.09648 0.24772 0.03114 3.10 0.0026
Life
World Peace -0.05915 -0.19335 0.02807 -2.11 0.0378
Social Power 0.05575 0.17940 0.02666 2.09 0.0393     









   
     
 
    
    
 
 
O P E N N E S S
TO TRANSCENDENCE




Curiosity Unity with Nature
SELF- UNIVERSALISM




Ability to g. Spirituality
Choose Own Goals World :_ ' i
Daring variety 3W, B E NEV o L E N C E
in Life .. 3 Forgivingness
STIMULATION SeII- Wisdom Maw" M" Helpfulness
Excitement Respect True Meaning H
Friendship 1“ Life onesty
HEDONISM Responsibility Loyalty
















2 Authority of Favors National
Security
.(e).






Figure 8: Materialism regression model at the individual value level.
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This seemingly anomalous situation can be explained by returning to the
Schwartz (1992; 1994) research on the relationships between human values. His
findings indicate that the field of 57 human values and the ten value types they
define are basically all viewed as “positives” by most human beings within all
major cultures of the world. The two-dimensional value pie, defined by Schwartz
(1992; 1994), was created by Similar Space Analysis (SSA), a non-metric multi-
dimensional scaling model, specifically because correlation calculations failed to
identify significant negative correlations within the universe of human values.
Review of the Schwartz research confirms that it was unlikely that a single factor,
such as materialism, could have been found to be positively correlated to certain
values, while being negatively and significantly correlated to competing values.
Since all human values are basically seen as positive goals or attributes,
each human being has a unique ranking or personal prioritization of specific values
and value types. There appears to be a cluster of values that are positively
correlated with materialism and there is an opposing cluster of values that compete
with those values, but the two clusters are not negatively correlated and the
“nonmaterialistic” cluster is not significantly and negatively correlated to
materialism. It simply “competes” with the materialistic values, and with
materialism, for human attention to less materialistic concerns.
Successful identification of several regression models that are predictive of
materialism does not conflict with the results of correlation analysis. The robust
regression models, with factors that are both “positive” and “negative” in relation
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to materialism, does not mean those factors are negatively correlated to each other
or to materialism. They simply indicate that there are values that are positively
correlated with materialism and other competing of opposing factors that tend to
detract from materialism when combined within a model specifically designed to
predict levels of materialism.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
In the Broadway play, A Raisin in The Sun, one character yells out, “I want
so many things, it drives me crazy. . .money is life” (Hansberry, 1995, p. 16). “The
task of the motivation man character was to carefully sort out what drove this
young man crazy and package the solutions into bottles and boxes” (Altchuler and
Regush, 1975, p. 39). Shalom Schwartz (1994, p. 21) defined values as
“desirable. . .goals. . .that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person.”
Richins and Dawson (1992, p. 307), found that some persons believe “possession
of things is the ultimate source of happiness,” causing them to create a
“religion. . .of things,” to the degree that materialism becomes a dominant
“lifestyle.” Browne and Kaldenberg (1997, p. 32) described materialism as “a
cluster of related traits, attitudes, and values focusing on possessions and guiding”
consumer behavior. Is there a particular values orientation, or a pattern or cluster
of individual values or value types, closely associated with the materialistic
behavior and attitudes of some consumers?
The literature on materialism and human values indicates the unique
orientation of a person’s values may be related to, and may even be causative of,
that person’s attitudes and behaviors with regard to consumer materialism. Modern
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consumers have been bombarded with ads designed to alter their values priorities
and to provide “incentives to work harder and harder in order to buy more and
more goods” (Altchuler and Regush, 1975, p. 33).
Correlation and regression analyses, based on the data collected for this
study, indicate there is some validity to the propositions drawn from the literature.
First, and most clearly, there appears to be a cluster of values that are closely
related to materialism. The cluster consists of 14 specific, individual values,
mostly within the power, hedonism, and achievement value types, and also largely
within the self-enhancement quadrant of the two-dimensional values space defined
by the Schwartz (1990, 1992, 1994) stream of values research. Wealth, social
recognition, and social power, within the power type, and enjoying life, within the
hedonism type, appear to be the leading values defining and contributing to a more
materialistic attitude. Opposite that cluster, in the two-dimensional sphere defined
by Schwartz (1992; 1994), concern for social justice and perhaps world peace and
equality; values found in the universalism type and near the boundary with the
benevolence type, appear to perhaps contribute negatively, but with much less
impact, to materialistic attitudes and behaviors.
The power value type and, to a lesser extent, the hedonism value type,
appear, based on the correlations and the regression analyses to comprise two
powerful nodes within the cluster of materialistic values. Adjoining portions of the
stimulation and security value types, lying on either side of the power-hedonism
duality, and portions of the achievement type, which lies between power and
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hedonism, make up the balance of the values domain, or cluster, which is
associated positively with materialism. In conformance with values theory,
diametrically opposite the wealth, social power, social recognition values apex of
materialism, is the location of social justice, the sole individual value, demonstrated
to be negatively associated by correlation calculations, with materialistic attitudes
and behaviors.
Analysis of the data gathered for this study clearly supports the conclusion
that the self-enhancement values grouping, and particularly, the power and
hedonism types within that domain are positively associated with materialism. To
a lesser extent, there is some indication, although much less convincing, that the
competing self— transcendence group of values, comprised of the universalism and
benevolence types, may be negatively associated, although with less influence, with
materialistic attitudes and behaviors.
Both correlation calculations and regression analyses support the finding of
a large materialistic values cluster led by wealth, social power, enjoying life, and
social recognition. There is much more limited statistical support for only a small
and perhaps somewhat non-materialistic values cluster led by social justice and
possibly including world peace, world beauty, and a handful of the benevolence
and tradition values, such as mature love, honesty, forgiving nature, and
devoutness. The materialistic values cluster, which is clearly evidenced and is
definable, appears to have a considerably more powerful impact on levels of
materialism than does the principally hypothetical non-materialistic cluster. Only
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at the higher order values grouping level of self-transcendence, do non-materialistic
values appear to have nearly as much impact as do the materialistic values. It may
be that due to the large number of individual values used to define the self-
transcendence grouping versus the smaller number used to define the self-
enhancement group, the evidence of influence is not as apparent on the non—
materialistic side of the values spectrum until it is consolidated into the higher—
order grouping level.
It should also be recalled that Schwartz (1992; 1994) failed to identify
significant patterns of negative correlations between values and value types on
opposing sides of the two-dimensional values model. In fact, the two-dimensional
values model was defined by non-metric Similarity Space Analysis (SSA)
techniques and not correlation calculations or regression analyses (Schwartz, 1992;
1994). Results of this study may coincide with the Schwartz (1992; 1994) findings
in confirming that perhaps most humans manage, through internal conflict and
frequent misdirection, to hold to complex and sometimes conflicting values
orientations. In other words, many of us highly regard values that are on opposing
sides of the Schwartz (1992; 1994) values chart. And most humans see all, or
nearly all of the entire spectrum of defined values, as positive, desirable virtues.
For that reason, although the values on opposite sides sometimes involve
competing, conflicting goals, they may not be clearly distinguishable into




It has been pointed out, in recent years, that “marketing efforts encourage
materialism” which may, in turn, “have negative societal effects” (Muncy and
Eastman, 1998, p. 137). The materialistic value types of power, hedonism,
stimulation, and achievement and the specific values of wealth, social recognition,
social power, enjoyment of life, pleasure, self-indulgence, daring, excitement,
success, ambition, authority, preserving public image, cleanliness, and influence all
have come to be equated with happiness. Those of us, in the western world, who
have bought into the corporate world’s “dominant message. . .(of) BUY, BUY,
BUY” are now “channeling all our energies into the marketplace” (Atchuler and
Regush, 1975, p. 45). Marketers who wish to cause consumers to be more
interested in the accumulation of goods, can clearly do so by selling greater
acceptance of the particular values and value types that are closely related to
materialism. Will we see the day when marketers of consumer goods feel pressure
to refrain from pushing their wares to those who are prone to materialism just as
producers of alcoholic spirits spend ad dollars promoting responsible drinking?
In addition to academic researchers, corporate marketers, consumer
activists, government consumer agencies, legislative bodies, and others may have
an interest in continued research into the connections between human values
orientations and materialism. Just as public pressure has been brought to bear on
the producers and marketers of alcohol and tobacco products, society may develop
more interest in controlling the message of marketers with respect to values
139
orientations and their potential impact on materialistic consumer behavior. Society
has long assumed that economic growth is imperative and that high-pressure
marketing is an important adjunct to that growth. However, when one examines
the values associated with materialism and the values that may be neglected or
ignored by highly materialistic consumers, there may be resulting consumer
behaviors that are not in society’s overall best interests. Society may not benefit
from marketers promoting the drive for social power and wealth if those who hear
the message ignore the competing values of social justice and world peace. What if
the Madison Avenue message of success and social recognition causes consumers
to fail to recognize the worth in the competing values of mature love and
responsibility? Will one of the consequences of acceptance of the materialistic
values be higher divorce rates or more fatherless children? Is it “socially
irresponsible for marketers to encourage materialism” without a clear
“understanding of the effects. . .on individuals, families, society, etc.” (Muncy and
Eastman, 1998, p. 137). One recent researcher quoted earlier studies in speculating
“that young adults reared in disrupted families exhibit higher levels of materialism”
than those from stable, two-parent, home environments (Flouri, 1999, p. 709).
Another study found “considerable evidence that family structure is related to both
materialism and compulsive consumption” (Rindfleisch, Burroughs, and Denton,
1997, p. 320). However, the Flouri (1999, p. 720) study did not support his earlier
supposition; he found “family structure did not have either a direct or a moderating
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effect on materialism.” The question of family structure and its effects on
materialism, if any, is unresolved.
Also, some investigators contend “a never ending quest for more material
possessions is harming the environment” (Muncy and Eastman, 1998, p. 137). At
least one researcher has also proposed that “materialism is negatively associated
with satisfying interpersonal relationships and feelings of self-worth” (Flouri,
1999, p. 720). These are some of the many additional possible areas of values-
materialism related research.
While this study provides evidence of the existence of a cluster of values
and value types that are related to materialism, it fails to provide convincing
evidence for an opposing cluster of non-materialistic values. Again, the two
clusters of values, on opposite sides of the two—dimensional space defined by
Schwartz (1992; 1994), may not be identifiable by correlation calculations. In the
Schwartz (1992; 1994) stream of research, Similarity Space Analysis (SSA) was
utilized, a non-parametric statistical technique widely used in Europe but not well
known in the United States. Future researchers may find additional information by
use of SSA, or other, non-parametric types of analysis. There are two competing
clusters of values, on opposite sides of the two-dimensional values space. One
appears to be positively correlated with materialism. The other, opposing cluster of
values, simply competes for human attention, but does not significantly and
negatively impact materialism.
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The questionnaire used for this research was somewhat lengthy and very
time-consuming, typically 45 minutes to an hour, for those who agreed to
participate in the sample. Some of the time consumed with the survey was due to
the Schwartz Value Survey’s rank/rate method required for values. Because there
are 57 values on the survey, each of which must be considered an assigned a value,
respondents are asked to survey the entire list and then identify the few values that
are most important to them and assign an appropriate value. They are then asked to
perform a similar review to identify the few values that are least important to them
and assign an appropriate value to those. Respondents are instructed to read
through the entire list once again to rate each of the remaining values consistently
with their anchor ratings of those that are most and least important to them. This
process is described as a rank/rate procedure by Schwartz and is most time
consuming for certain respondents. The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) portion of
the questionnaire is a particularly lengthy component. The completion time factor
contributed to a smaller sample size than was originally envisioned. While the
numbers seemed to be statistically adequate to lend support to the conclusions,
added information might be evidenced by larger samples. Schwartz, et al (2001)
recently investigated the validity of a much more brief, newly developed,
instrument for the measurement of values orientations that focuses only on the ten
value types and not on individual values. While the new instrument has some
demonstrated limitations, it could prove useful for any future values-materialism
research by allowing for the practical, convenient sampling of larger groups.
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This research was intended to provide a clearer understanding of any
relationships between human values orientations and levels of consumer
materialism. It does provide evidence for two significant points. First, there is a
cluster of values, centered around the power and hedonism value types, that is
significantly and positively correlated with higher levels of materialism. Persons
who place a high priority on these values will tend to be more materialistic in their
attitudes and behaviors than persons who don’t.
Secondly, while it is not a negatively correlated cluster of values, since all
values tend to be viewed as positives, there is a “conflicting” cluster of values
centered in the universalism and benevolence types that compete with the
materialism values for priority. This competing cluster of values is associated with
attitudes and behaviors that could be defined as non-materialistic, but is probably
more properly defined as being concerned with more universal, benevolent, or
selfless endeavors rather than materialistic ones.
Recommendations for Further Research
As previously mentioned, use of the new, more brief, values instrument
recently developed by Schwartz, et al (2001) could be helpful in garnering enlarged
sample sizes in any future research.
One area of possible interest to consumer groups, such as credit counselors,
could be investigation of successful advertising or training techniques intended to
moderate excessively materialistic tendencies among consumers by altering values
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orientations. Consumers themselves might be interested in self—testing for values
orientations to determine if any particular consumer training or education would be
useful to them. Many groups may be interested in further investigation into the two
groups of competing values and various behaviors or attitudes that may be
associated with either group. If more materialistic persons tend to place less value
on universalism, benevolence, and tradition values, then are they more prone to
family break-up, or to divorce? Are those who are more materialistic more inclined
to have credit or money management difficulties? Which group, those who are
more or less materialistic, tends to make better employees? Do those who are less
obsessed with material goods miss less work and have better overall work records?
There are many possible questions or lines of inquiry that could provide answers
useful to society through more research into human values orientations and
materialism.
One researcher has suggested that further investigation into materialism and
values should look more closely at “other factors that contribute to the development
of values, such as schools, peer groups, churches, and the media,” particularly
advertising, along with family structure (Flouri, 1999, p. 723). Others have
preliminarily investigated whether marketing efforts aimed at “causing one to
become more materialistic may also cause him or her to have lower ethical
standards” (Muncy and Eastman, 1998, p. 144). One recent researcher found
evidence that materialistic persons are not satisfied with their standard of living,
which causes “dissatisfaction with life in general” (Sirgy, 1998, p. 43).
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Over a century ago, researcher Edwin Seligman (1901, p. 612-613)
observed that the “existence of man. . .the framework of the social structure”
depends upon what Aristotle described as “the essential interrelation of politics,
ethics, and economics.” Ethics or virtues, which are closely related to human
values orientations, and materialism, which is a particular economic focus, are





Abate, F. (Ed). (1999). Oxford American Dictionary and Language Guide.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Allen, M. W. (2001). A practical method for uncovering the direct and
indirect relationships between human values and consumer purchases. Journal of
Consumer Marketing, 18 (2), 102-120.
Allport, G. (1961). Pattern and growth in personality. New York: Holt,
Rinehart, & Winston.
Allport, G., Vernon, P., & Lindsey, G. (1961). A Study of Values. Boston:
Houghton Mifflin.
Alwin, D. & Krosnick, J. (1985). The measurement of values in surveys: a
comparison of ratings and rankings. Public Opinion Quarterly, 49 (4), 535-552.
Anderson, S. (1919). Winesburg, Ohio: a group of tales of Ohio small
town life. New York: B. W. Huebsch.
Arendt, H. (1958). The Human Condition. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Bartleby.com. (n.d.). Retrieved August 24, 2001, from
http://www.bartleby.com/
Bauman, Z. (1998). Wcficonsumerism, and the new poor. Philadelphia,
PA: Open University Press.
Belk, R. (1983). Worldly possessions: issues and criticisms. Advances in
Consumer Research, 10, 514—519.
147
Belk, R. (1984). Three scales to measure constructs related to materialism:
reliability, validity, and relationships to measures of happiness. Advances in
Consumer Research, 2, 291-297.
Belk, R. (1985). Materialism: trait aspects of living in the material world.
Journal of Consumer Research, 12 (3), 265-280.
Belk, R., Dholakia, N., & Venkatesh, A. (1996). Consumption and
marketing: macro dimensions. Cincinnati, OH: South-Westem College Publishing.
Bengston, V. (1975). Generation and family effects in value socialization.
American Sociological Review, 40 (3), 358-371.
Bengston, V. & Lovejoy, M. (1973). Values, personality, and social
structure. American Behavioral Scientist, 16 (1), 880-912.
Beutel, A. (1995). Gender and values. American Sociological Review, 60
 
(3), 436-448.
Beutel, A. & Marini, M. (1995). Gender and values. American
Sociological Review, 60, 436-448.
Bloom, H. (1995). The Lucifer Principle. St. Leopards: Allen & Unwin.
Boehnke, K., Stromberg, C., Murari, P., Richmond, B., & Chandra, S.
(1998). Reflecting the world “out there”: a cross-cultural perspective on worries,
values and well-being. Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, 17 (2), 227-247.
Braithewaite, V. (1994). Beyond Rokeach’s equality-freedom model: two-
dimensional world. Journal of Social Issues,50 (4), 67-95.
148
Braithwaite, V. & Law, H. (1985). Structure of human values: testing the
adequacy of the Rokeach Value Survey. Journal of Personal and Social
Psychology, 49 (1), 250-263.
Bredemeier, H. & Toby, J. (1963). Social Problems in America: Costs and
Casualties in an Acquisitive Society. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Browne, B. A., & Kaldenberg, D. O. (1997). Conceptualizing self-
monitoring: links to materialism and product involvement. Journal of Consumer
 
Marketing, 14(1), 31-45.
Burdsal, C. (1975). An examination of second order motivational factors
as found in adults. Journal of Genetic Psychology, 127 (3), 83-89.
Campbell, D. (1969). Various social attitude scales. Measures of Political
Attitudes. (Eds.). Robinson, J. & Shaver, P. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press.
Campbell, C. (1987). The Romantic Ethic and Spirit of Modern
Consumerism. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Catton, W. (1954). Exploring techniques for measuring human values.
American Sociological Review, 19 (1), 49-55.
Catton, W. (1956). A retest of the measurability of certain human values.
American Sociological Review, 21 (3), 357-359.
Catton, W. (1959). A theory of value. American Sociological Review, 24
(3), 310-317.
149
Chatterjee, A., & Hunt, J. M. (1996). Self-monitoring as a personality
correlate of materialism: an investigation of related cognitive orientation.
Psychological Reports, 79, 523-528.
Clark, T. N. (2000). Is materialism rising in America? Social Science and
Public PolicyLSeptember/October, 47-48.
Claxton, R., Murray, J., & Janda, S. (1995). Spouses’ materialism: effects
of parenthood status, personality type, and sex. Journal of Consumer Policy, 18 (2-
3), 267-291.
Corfman, K., Lehmann, D., & Narayanan, S. (1991). Values, utility, and
ownership: modeling the relationships for consumer durables. Journal of Retailing,
 
6_7 (2), 184-204.
Costello, R. (Ed.). (1996). Random House Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.
New York: Random House.
Crosby, L., Bitner, M., & Gill, J. (1990). Organizational structure of
values. Journal of Business Research, 20, 123-134.
Csikszenthimalyi, M. (1999). If we are so rich, why can’t we be happy?
American Psychologist,54 (10), 821-827.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2000). The costs and benefits of consuming.
Journal of Consumer Research, 27, 267-272.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. & Rochberg-Halton, E. (1978). Reflections on
materialism. University of Chicago Magazine, 70 (3), 6-15.
150
Cushman, P. (1990). Why the self is empty: toward a historically situated
psychology. American Psychologist,4_5 (5), 599-611.
Daune, A. (1983). The materialistic lifestyle: some socio-psychological
aspects. Consumer Behavior and Environmental Quality, Uusitalo, L. (ed.), New
York: St. Martin’s Press.
Davis, K. and Moore, W. (1945). Some principles of stratification.
American Sociological Review, 10, 242-245.
de Tocqueville, A. (1946). Democracy in America. Edinburgh: R. & R.
Clark, Ltd.
De Young, R. (1985-1986). Encouraging environmentally appropriate
behavior: the role of intrinsic motivation. Journal of Environmental Systems,1_5
(4), 281-292.
Deci, E. & Ryan, R. (1985). Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination
in Human Behavior. New York: Plenum Press.
Dickins, D. & Ferguson, V. (1957). Practices and attitudes of rural white
children and parents concerning money. Mississippi Agricultural Experiment
Station Technical Bulletin 43.
Diener, E. (2000). Subjective well-being: the science of happiness.
American Psychologist, 55 (1), 34-43.
Dimma, W. (1991). The decline of ethics. Business Quarterly, 55 (3), 8-
10.
151
Dittmar, H. (1992). The Social Psychology of Material Possessions: To
Have Is to Be. New York: St. Martin’s.
Du Bois, C. (1955). The dominant value profile of American culture.
American Anthropologist, 57 (Dec.), 1232-1239.
Easterlin, R., & Crimmins, E. (1991). Private materialism, personal self-
fulfillment, family life, and public interest: the nature, effects, and causes of recent
changes in the values of American youth. Public Opinion Quarterly, 55 (4), 499—
 
534.
Eastman, J., Fredenberger, B., Campbell, D., & Calvert, S. (1997). The
relationship between status consumption and materialism: a cross—cultural
comparison of Chinese, Mexican, and American students. Journal of Marketing
 
Theory and Practice, 5 (1), 52-66.
Engel, J ., Blackwell, R., & Miniard, P. (1995). Consumer Behavior. Fort
Worth: The Dryden Press, Harcourt Brace College Publishers.
Fallding, H. (1965). A proposal for the empirical study of values,
American Sociological Review, 30, 223-233.
Flouri, E. (1999). An integrated model of consumer materialism: can
economic socialization and maternal values predict materialistic attitudes in
adolescents? The Journal of Socio—Economics, 28, 707-724.
Foumier, S. & Richins, M. (1991). Some theoretical and popular notions
concerning materialism. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 6 (6), 403-
414.
152
Fox, R. (1983). Epitaph for Middletown: Robert S. Lynd and the analysis
of consumer culture. The Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American
History, 1880-1980. Fox, R. & Lears, T. (Eds.) New York: Pantheon Books.
Fox, R. & Lears, T. (Eds). (1983). The Culture of Consumption: Critical
 
Essays in American History, 1880-1980. New York: Pantheon Books.
Geiger, G. (1944). Can we choose between values? The Journal of
 
Philosophy, 41 (l 1), 292-298.
Ger, G. & Belk, R. (1996). Cross-cultural differences in materialism.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 17 (1), 55-73.
Hansberry, L. (1995). A Raisin in The Sun: The Unfilmed Original
Screenplay. NY: Viking Penguin.
Heilbroner, R. (1956). The Quest for Wealth: A Study of Acquisitive Man.
New York: Simon and Schuster.
Himmelfarb, G. (2001). One nation, two cultures. New York: Vintage
Books.
Holt, D. B. (1995). How consumers consume: a typology of consumption
practices. Journal of Consumer Research, 22 (2), 1-14.
Horowitz, D. (1985). The Morality of Spending: Attitudes Toward
Consumer Society in America, 1875-1940. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
University Press.
153
Hunt, J ., Keman, J., Chatterjee, A., & Florsheim, R. (1990). Locus of
control as a personality correlate of materialism: an empirical note. Psychological
Reports, 67, 1101-1102.
Isaacs, S. (1935). Property and possessiveness. British Journal of Medical
Psychology, 15, 69-78.
Jackson, D., Ahmed, S., & Heapy, N. (1976). Is achievement a unitary
construct? Journal of Research in Personality, 10 ( 1), 1-21.
Johnston, C. (1995). The Rokeach value survey: underlying structure and
multidimensional scaling. The Journal of Psychology, 129 (5), 583-604.
 
Justice, B. & Birkman, R. (1972). An effort to distinguish the violent from
the nonviolent. Southern Medical Journal, 65 (6), 703-706.
Kahle, L. (1983). Social Values and Social Change: Adaptation to Life in
America. New York: Praeger.
Kahle, L., Beatty, S., & Homer, P. (1986). Alternative measurement
approaches to consumer values: the list of values (LOV) and values and life style
(VALS). Journal of Consumer Research, 13 (3), 405-409.
Kamakura, W. A., & Mazzon, J. A. (1991). Value segmentation: a model
for the measurement of values and value systems. Journal of Consumer Research,
fl (2), 208-219.
Kamakura, W. A., & Novak, T. P. (1992). Value-system segmentation:
exploring the meaning of LOV (list of values). Journal of Consumer Research, 19
(1),119-133.
154
Kane, R. (1998). Dimensions of value and the aims of social inquiry. _T_h_e
American Behavioral Scientist,41 (4), 578-597.
Kasser, T., & Ryan, R. M. (1993). A dark side of the American dream:
correlates of financial success as a central life aspiration. Journal of Personality
 
and Social Psychology, 65 (2), 410-422.
Kinnier, R., Kemes, J., & Dautheribes, T. (2000). A short list of universal
moral values. Counseling and Values, 45 ( 1), 4-16.
Kitwood, T. & Smithers, A. (1975). Measurement of human values: an
appraisal of the work of Milton Rokeach. Educational Research, 17 (3), 175-179.
Kleespie, T. (2002). Branding Branded. Future: The Magazine of the
University of Phoenix, Spring, 2002, 1.
Kwon, J., Wirtz, J., Tan, S., & Kau, A. (1999). The seven faces of
Singaporeans: a typology of Singapore consumers and their aspirations and life
satisfaction. Asia-Pacific Journal of Management, 16 (2), 229-248.
La Barbera, P. & Gurhan, Z. (1997). The role of materialism, religiosity,
and demographics in subjective well-being. Psychology and Marketing, 14, 71-97.
Lears, T. (1983). From salvation to self-realization: advertising and the
therapeutic roots of the consumer culture, 1880-1930. The Culture of
 
Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880-1980. Fox, R. & Lears,
T. (ed.) New York: Pantheon Books.
Lewis, C. (1944). The Abolition of Man. New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, Inc.
155
Lovejoy, A. (1950). Terminal and adjectival values. The Journal of
Philosophy, 47 (21), 593-608.
Lundstrom, W. & White, S. (1999). Intergenerational and cultural
differences in materialism: an empirical investigation of consumers from France
and the USA. Journal of Euro-Marketing,7 (2), 47-65.
Mayton, D. M., Ball-Rokeach, S. J ., & Loges, W. E. (1994). Human
values and social issues: an introduction. Journal of Social Issues, 50 (4), 1-9.
 
McCarty, J. & Shrum, L. (2000). The measurement of personal values in
survey research: a test of alternative procedures. Public Opinion Quarterly, 64 (3),
271-298.
Meglino, B. & Ravlin, E. (1998). Individual values in organizations:
concepts, controversies, and research. Journal of Management, 24 (3), 351-390.
Mick, D. G. (1996). Are studies of dark side variables confounded by
socially desirable responding? The case of materialism. Journal of Consumer
 
Research, 23, 106-119.
Morris, W. (Ed). (1981). The Grollier International Dictionary. Danbury,
CT: Houghton Mifflin Company.
Moschis, G. & Churchill, G. (1978). Consumer socialization: a theoretical
and empirical analysis. Journal of Consumer Research,15 (4), 599-609.
Mukerji, C. (1983). From Graven Images: Patterns of Materialism. New
York: Columbia University Press.
156
Mullin, R. (1988). The work ethic of the Bishop’s pastoral on the
economy. Journal of Business Ethics,7 (6), 419-424.
Muncy, J. & Eastman, J. (1998). Materialism and consumer ethics: an
exploratory study. Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 137-145.
Muncy, J. & Vitell, S. (1992). Consumer ethics: an empirical investigation




Netemeyer, R., Burton, S., & Lichtenstein, D. (1995). Trait aspects of
vanity: measurement and relevance to consumer behavior. Journal of Consumer
Research, 21 (4), 612-626.
Novak, M. (1996). The spirit of democratic capitalism. In M. Gerson
(Ed.), The Neo-Conservative Reader (pp.116-150). Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley.
O’Guinn, T. & Faber, R. (1989). Compulsive buying: a phenomenological
exploration. Journal of Consumer Research, 16 (September), 147-157.
Rankin, W. & Grube, J. (1980). A comparison of ranking and rating
procedures for value system measurement. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 10, 233-246.
Rassuli, K. & Hollander, S. (1986). Desire — induced, innate, insatiable?
The Journal of Macromarketing, 6 (2), 4-24.
Reynolds, T. & Jolly, J. (1980). Measuring personal values: an evaluation
of alternative methods. Journal of Marketing Research, 17 (4), 531-536.
157
Richins, M. (1987). Media, materialism, and human happiness.
Association for Consumer Research, 14, 352-356.
Richins, M. (1990). Measuring material values: a preliminary report of
scale development. Advances in Consumer Research, 17, 169-175.
Richins, M. (1994). Special possessions and the expression of material
values. Journal of Consumer Research, 21 (3), 522-533.
Richins, M. & Dawson, S. (1992). A consumer values orientation for
materialism and its measurement: scale development and validation. Journal of
Consumer Research, 19, 303-316.
Richins, M. & Rudman, F. (1994). Materialism and economic psychology.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 15 (2), 217-231.
Rindfleisch, A, Burroughs, J., & Denton, F. (1997). Family structure,
materialism, and compulsive consumption. Journal of Consumer Research, 23,
312-325.
Roccas, S., & Schwartz, S. (1997). Church—state relations and the
association of religiosity with values: a study of Catholics in six countries. _Cr_osi
Cultural Research, 31 (4), 356-377.
Rochberg-Halton, E. (1986). Meaning and Modernity: Social Theory in
the Pragmatic Attitude. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Rokeach, M. (1960). The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations into the
Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems. New York: Basic Books, Inc.
158
Rokeach, M. (1968-1969). The role of values in public opinion research.
Public Opinion Quarterly, 32 (4), 547-559.
Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human Values. New York, NY: The
Free Press.
Sanders, S. (2001). Fromm’s marketing character and Rokeach values.
Social Behavior and Personality, 29 (2), 191-198.
Schneider, H. (1917). The theory of values. The Journal of Philosophy, 14
(6), 141-154.
Schroeder, J. & Dugal, S. (1995). Psychological correlates of the
materialism construct. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 10, 243-253.
Schultz, P., & Zelezny, L.. (1998). Values and proenvironmental behavior:
a five country survey. Journal of Cross-Cultural PsychologyL29 (4), 540-558.
Schwartz, B. (1994). On morals and markets. (James Q. Wilson’s ‘The
Moral Sense’). Criminal Justice Ethics 13 (2), 61-69.
 
Schwartz, S. (1990). Individualism-collectivism: critique and proposed
refinements. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 21 (2), 139-155.
Schwartz, S. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values:
theoretical advances and empirical test in 20 countries. Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology, 25, 1-65.
Schwartz, S. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and
contents of human values? Journal of Social Issues, 50 (4), 19-45.
159
Schwartz, S. & Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a psychological structure of
human values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 550-562.
Schwartz, S. & Bilsky, W. (1990). Toward a theory of the universal
content and structure of values: extensions and cross-cultural replications. m1
of Personal and Social Psychology, 58 (5), 878-891.
Schwartz, S., & Huismans, S. (1995). Value priorities and religiosity in
four western religions. Social Psychology Quarterly, 58 (2), 88-108.
Schwartz, 8., Melech, G., Lehman, A., Burgess, S., Harris, M., and Owens,
V. (2001). Extending the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human
values with a different method of measurement. Journal of Cross-Cultural
Psychology, 32 (5), 519-542.
Seligman, E. (1901). The economic interpretation of history. m
Science Quarterly, 16 (4), 612-640.
Shama, A. & Wisenblit, J. (1984). Values of voluntary simplicity.
Psychological Reports, 55 (August-December), 231-241.
Sharpe, J. P., & Ramanaiah, N. V. (1999). Materialism and the five-factor
model of personality. Psychological Reports, 85, 327-330.
Simpson, J. & Weiner, E. (Eds.). (1989). Oxford English Dictionary.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sirgy, M. J. (1998). Materialism and the quality of life. Social Indicators
 
Research, 43 (3), 227-261.
160
Spates, J. (1983). The sociology of values. Annual Review of Sociology,
2, 27-49.
Stern, R, Dietz, T., & Guagnano, G. (1998). A brief inventory of values.
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 58 (6), 984- 1001.
Susman, W. (1973). Culture as History: The Transformiion of American
Society in the Twentieth Century. New York: Pantheon Books.
Twitchell, J. (1999). Two cheers for materialism. The Wilson Quarterly,
 
23 (2), 16-22.
Uusitalo, L. (1983). Consumer Behavior and Environmental Quality:
Trends and Prospects in the Ways of Life. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Van Voorst, R. (Ed.). (2000). Anthology of World Scriptures. Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Wachtel, P. (1983). The Poverty of Affluence: A Psychological Portrait of
the American Way of Life. New York: The Free Press.
Wackman, D., Reale, G., & Ward, S. (1972). Racial differences in
responses to advertising among adolescents. Television in Day-to-Day Life. (Ed.).
Rubenstein, E. Rockville, MD: US. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare, 543-551.
Ward, S. & Wackman, D. (1971). Family and media influences on
adolescent consumer learning. American Behavioral Scientist, 14 (1), 415-427.
Weber, M. (1958). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New
York: Scribner’s.
161
Whitcraft, C. (1989). Ethical decisions: beyond greed through education.
Journal of State Government, 62 (5), 189-194.
Wilson, C. (1983). The rhetoric of consumption: mass-market magazines
and the demise of the gentle reader, 1880-1920. The Culture of Consumption:
Critical Essays in American History, 1880-1980. Fox, R. & Lears, T. (ed.) New
York: Pantheon Books.
Wilson, J. Q. (1997). The Moral Sense. New York, NY: Simon & 
Schuster.
Yamauchi, K. & Templer, D. (1982). The development of a money
attitude scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 46 (3), 522-528.
162
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agnew, J. (1983). The consuming vision of Henry James. m
Culture of Consumption: Critical Essays in American History, 1880-1980.
Fox, R. & Lears, T. (ed.) New York: Pantheon Books.
Adler, M. J. (1985). Ten philosophical mistakes. New York, NY:
Simon & Schuster, Inc.
Bilsky, W. & Schwartz, S. (1994). Values and personality.
European Journal of Personality, 8, 163-181.
Braun, O. & Wickland, R. (1989). Psychological Antecedents of
Conspicuous Consumption. Journal of Economic Psychology, 10, 161-187.
Bruyn, S. T. (1999). The moral economy. Review of Social
Economy, 57 (1), 25-45.
Chandra, M. (1983). From Graven Images: Patterns of Modern
Materialism. New York: Columbia University Press.
Cleveland, C. J ., & Ruth, M. (1999). Indicators of
dematerialization and the materials intensity of use. Journal of Industrial
 
Ecology, 2 (3), 15-50.
Davis, D. W., Dowley, K. M., and Silver, B. D. (1999).
Postmaterialism in world societies: is it really a value dimension?,
American Journal of Political Science, 43 (3), 935-962.
Davis, J. A. (1996). Review essay [Review of the book 3%
change in global perspective]. Public Opinion Quarterly, 60, 322-331.
163
Diessner, R., Washbum, K., & Mayton, D. (1998). Self and others’
perceptions of “crass materialism.” The Journal of Social Psychology, 138
(1), 137-139.
Dowell, R. S., Goldfarb, R. S., & Griffith, W. B. (1998). Economic
man as a moral individual. Economic Inquiry, 36 (4), 645-654.
Elliott-Howard, F. E., DuFrene, D. D., & Daniel, L. G. (1997). The
ethical issues rating: an instrument for measuring ethical orientation of
college students toward various business practices. Educational and
Psychological Measurement, 57 (3), 515-527.
Feather, N., Norman, M., & Worsley, A. (1998). Values and
valences: variables relating to the attractiveness and choice of food in
different contexts. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28 (7), 639-657.
Fukuyama, F. (1999). The great disruption. The Atlantic Monthly,
& (5), 38-53.
Geis, G. (1994). Moral innatism, connatural ideas, and impuissance
in daily affairs: James Q. Wilson’s acrobatic dive into an empty pool.
Criminal Justice Ethics, 13 (2), 77-82.
Gilder, G. (1996). Moral sources of capitalism. In M. Gerson (Ed.),
The Neo-Conservative Reader (pp. 1 151-160). Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley.
Grube, J. W., Mayton, D. M., & Ball-Rokeach, S. J. (1994).
Inducing change in values, attitudes, and behaviors: belief system theory
164
and the method of value self-confrontation. Journal of Social Issues, 50 (4),
153-174.
Harsch, B. A. (1999). Consumerism and environmental policy:
moving past consumer culture. EcologyLaw Quarterly, 26 (3), 543-596.
Hawkins, D., Best, R., & Coney, K. (1992). Consumer Behavior:
Implications for Marketing Strategy. Boston: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.
Heaven, P. C. (1990). Economic beliefs and human values: further
evidence of the two-value model? The Journal of Social Psychology, 130
(5), 583-590.
Henderson, J. P. (1989). “The relation of ethics to economics”: J.S.
MacKenzie’s challenge to neoclassical economics. Review of Social
 
Economy, 47 (3), 239-266.
Henkoff, R. (1989). Is greed dead? Fortune, 120 (4), 40-45.
 
Inglehart, R. (1981). Post-materialism in an environment of
insecurity. The American Political Science Review, 75 (4), 880-900.
Isaac, A. G. (1997). Morality, maximization, and economic
behavior. Southern Economic Journal, 63 (3), 559-571.
Kidder, R. M. (1995). Universal human values: finding an ethical
common ground. Public Management, 77 (6), 4-10.
Kristol, I. (1996). When virtue loses all her loveliness — some
reflections on capitalism and the free society. In M. Gerson (Ed), The Neo-
Conservative Reader (pp.103-115). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
165
Lowen, J. (1993). Is everything permitted? Reconnecting
psychology and ethics. Free Inquiry, l3 (3), 22-24.
Mathews, G. (1996). The pursuit of a life worth living in Japan and
the United States. Ethnology, 35 ( 1), 51-63.
McConnell, R. (1995). The role of parapsychology in the re-
establishment of morality. The Journal of Parapsychology, 59 (3), 273-276.
Mowen, J. (1990). Consumer Behavior. New York: MacMillan
Publishing Company.
Myers, D. (2000). The funds, friends, and faith of happy people.
American Psychologist, 55 (1), 56-68.
Norgaard, R. B. (1995). Beyond materialism: a coevolutionary
reinterpretation of the environmental crisis. Review of Social Economy, 53
 
(4), 475-492.
O’Boyle, E. J. (1991). On justice and charity. Review of Social
Economy, 49 (4), 578-596.
O’Riordan, T. (1995). Frameworks for choice: core beliefs and the
environment. Environment, 37 (8), 4-15.
Ostini, R., & Ellerman, D. A. (1997). Clarifying the relationships
between values and moral judgment. Psychological Reports, 81 (2), 691-
702.
Prince-Gibson, E. & Schwartz, S. (1998). Value priorities and
gender. Social Psychology Quarterly, 61 (1), 49-68.
166
Punter, L., & Gangneux, D. (1998). Social accountability: the most
recent element to ensure total quality management. Total Quality
 
Management, 9 (4-5), 196-199.
Raines, J. P. (1989). Frank H. Knight’s contributions to social
economics. Review of Social Economy, 47 (3), 280-293.
Richins, M. (1995). Social comparison, advertising, and consumer
discontent. American Behavioral Scientist, 38 (4), 593-608.
Schick, T. (1998). Is morality a matter of taste? Why professional
ethicists think that morality is not purely ‘subjective.’ Free Inquiry, 18 (4),
32-35.
Schmooker, A. (1993). Fool’s Gold: The Fate of Values in a World
of Goods. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Shokouhi-Behnam, S. & Chambliss, C. (1996). Value priorities of
Iranian and American college students. Psychological Reports, 79 (1), 251-
257.
Stikkers, K. W. (1993). Moral sensibilities foe the social economy:
the challenges facing social economists in the twenty first century — a
philosopher’s perspective. Review of Social Economy, 51 (4), 441-455.
Stodder, J. (1998). Experimental moralities: ethics in classroom
experiments. The Journal of Economic Education, 29 (2), 127-139.
167
Subramanian, S. (1995). Preference motivations and libertarian
dilemmas. The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies,63 (2),
167-185.
Swagler, R. (1994). Evolution and applications of the term
consumerism: theme and variations. The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 28
(2), 347-365.
Szenberg, M. (1999). Imagination and morality, a note. American
Economist, 43 (2), 92-96.
Van de Vliert, E., Schwartz, S., Huisman, S., Hofstede, G., & Daan,
S. (1999). Temperature, cultural masculinity, and domestic political
violence: a cross-national study. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 30
(3), 292-293.
Warwick, P. V. (1998). Disputed cause, disputed effect: the
postmaterialist thesis re-examined. Public Opinion Quarterly, 62 (4), 583-
585.
Wilson, J. Q. (1996). Foreword. In M. Gerson (Ed), The Neo-
Conservative Reader (pp.vii-x), Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Winsted, K. (1997). The service experience in two cultures: a
behavioral perspective. Journal of Retailing, 73 (3), 337-360.
Worland, S. T. (1996). The Danner thesis and public choice theory:









Consumer & Industry Service Management
University of Tennessee — Knoxville
(423) 478-6245
This survey is designed to collect information for a doctoral dissertation
research project involving certain aspects of consumer behavior or attitudes
of adults and how those may be related to human values. Your
participation in this survey is entirely voluntary.
If you choose to participate by answering the attached questions, please do
not add your name or any other identification to the form. Your
responses should be completely anonymous. No one, other than a faculty
advisor, and myself will have access to your individual responses and you











Years of education each person has completed (since lSt grade)? Estimate if
not certain.


















How frequently, on the average, do you attend religious services (circle)?
Twice, or more, a week
Once a week
Once or twice a month
Several times a year

















What best describes your religious viewpoint (circle)?
1. Traditional
2. Progressive
3. Middle of the Road
4. None or Does not Apply
In what kind of place did you grow up (circle)?
1. Large City (500,000+)




In the following section you are to ask yourself: “What values are important
to ME as guiding principles in MY life, and what values are less important
to me?” In the parentheses following each value is an explanation that may
help you understand its meaning. Your task is to rate how important each
value is to you as a guiding principle in your life. Use the rating scale
below:
0 — means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding
principle for you.
3 — means the value is important.
6 — means the value is very important.
The higher the number, the more important the value is as a guiding
principle in YOUR life.
-1 — is for rating any values that are opposed to the principles that guide
you.
7 — is for rating a value that is of supreme importance as a guiding value in
your life; ordinarily there are no more than two or three such values.
In the space before each value, write the number (-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) that
indicates the importance of that value for you, personally. Try to
distinguish as much as possible between the values by using all the
numbers. You will, of course, need to use numbers more than once.
IMPORTANT: Before you begin, read the entire list of values, choose the
one or two that are most important to you and rate their importance. Next,
choose the value(s) that is most opposed to your values and rate it —1. If
there is no such value, choose the value(s) that are least important to you
and rate them 0 or 1, according to their importance. Then rate the all the
rest of the values.
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is (assign a number



















1 EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)
2____INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself)
3____SOCIAL POWER (control or dominance)
4__PLEASURE (gratification of desires)
5_FREEDOM (of action and thought)
6__SPIR1"TUALITY (emphasis on spiritual, not material matters)
7___BELONGING (others care about me)
8__SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)
9__EXCITEMENT (stimulating experiences)
10__MEANINGFULNESS (a purpose in life)
11__POL1TENESS (courtesy, good manners)
12_WEALTH (material possessions, money)
13_NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)
14_SELF RESPECT (belief in own worth)
15_RECIPROCATION OF FAVORS (avoidance of indebtedness)
16__CREATIVITY (unique, imaginative)
17_WORLD PEACE (free of war, conflict)
18_RESPECT TRADITION (preservation of time honored customs)
19____MATURE LOVE (emotional intimacy)
20___SELF DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)
21__PRIVACY (right to a private sphere)
22 FAMILY SECURITY (safety of family)
174
23_SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)
24___UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature)
25__VARIETY (challenge, novelty, change)
26__WISDOM (a mature grasp of life)
27_AUTHORITY (right to lead, command)
28__TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close friends)
29_WORLD BEAUTY (nature & the arts)
30_SOCIAL JUSTICE (care for the weak)
31__INDEPENDENCE (self sufficient)
32_MODERATION (avoiding extremes)
33_LOYALTY (true to friends, family)
34__AMBITION (hard-working, aspiring)
35_BROADMINDEDNESS (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)
36_HUMILITY (modest, self-effacing)
37___DARING (seeking adventure, risk)
38_PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT (save nature)
39__INFLUENCE (impact people & events)
40___HONOR FOR PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)
41___ABILITY TO CHOOSE OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)
42_HEALTH]NESS (not being ill, frail)
43 CAPABILITY (competent, efficient)
175
44 ACCEPTANCE OF PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life’s
circumstances)
45_HONESTY (genuine, sincerity)
46_PUBLIC IMAGE (saving face, respect)
47_OBEDIENCE (meet obligations, duty)
48_INTELLIGENCE (logical, thinking)
49__HELPFULNESS (work to help others)
50__ENJOYABLE LIFE (food, sex, leisure)
51_DEVOUTNESS (holding to religious faith and belief)
52_RESPONSIBILITY (dependable, reliable)
53_CURIOSITY (interested in everything, exploring)
54__FORGIVING NATURE (willing to pardon others)
55_SUCCESS (achieving one’s goals)
56_CLEANLINESS (neatness, tidiness)
57 SELF-INDULGENCE (doing pleasant things)
Write in the number of the response that best describes your reaction to
















I admire people who own expensive homes, cars, and clothes.
. I usually buy only the things I need.
I have all the things I really need to enjoy life.
It sometimes bothers me quite a bit that I can’t afford to buy all
the things I’d like.
I put less emphasis on material things than most people I know.
Buying things gives me a lot of pleasure.
I try to keep my life simple, as far as possessions are concerned.
My life would be better ifI owned certain things I don’t have.
I like a lot of luxury in my life.
Some of the most important achievements in life include
acquiring material possessions.
The things I own aren’t all that important to me.
I like to own things that impress people.
I enjoy spending money on things that aren’t practical.
I wouldn’t be any happier if I owned nicer things.
I don’t place much emphasis on how many material objects
people own as a sign of success.
I’d be happier if I could afford to buy more things.
I don’t pay much attention to the material objects other people
own.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Stephen L. Warren was born May 12, 1947 in Bowling Green, Kentucky.
He grew up in several communities throughout western Kentucky and southern
Indiana and graduated from Hartford High School, in Hartford, Kentucky, in 1965.
Mr. Warren worked briefly as a surveying and engineering technician on
several highway construction projects for the Kentucky Department of Highways
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western Kentucky coalfields, near Greenville, Kentucky, in late 1966. After
progressing to a special projects engineering role and managing some early
computerized aerial photogrammetry engineering activities, in 1974 Mr. Warren
was promoted to an engineering management position near Terre Haute, Indiana.
In 1977 he was transferred to Evansville, Indiana as Director of Engineering and
Environmental Affairs for a multi-state division. In 1981, Mr. Warren asked to be
transferred into operations management and moved through several operations
superintendent positions over the next several years in southern Indiana and in
Texas. In late 1985 he was promoted to a multi-site General Superintendent
position and soon afterward to Director of Operations for a large operating division
covering sites in Kentucky, Alabama, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma,
and Texas. Meanwhile, in the early 1980’s, Mr. Warren had attended the
University of Evansville, on a part-time basis, and earned a Bachelor of Liberal
Studies degree.
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Mr. Warren accepted an offer from a competing mining firm in 1990 and
became President of the Roaring Creek Coal Company subsidiary of Amax Coal
Industries, Inc. In early 1991, Amax acquired Cannelton Industries, Inc. and Mr.
Warren became President and CEO of the combined subsidiaries, headquartered in
Charleston, West Virginia. Cannelton had mining operations in West Virginia,
Kentucky, and Tennessee and corporate marketing responsibilities for the eastern
US, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. At the end of 1996, Mr.
Warren elected to retire from the mining industry, after 30 years, and to complete
his Executive Master of Business Administration degree from the University of
Charleston.
In late 1997 Mr. Warren accepted a position at Cleveland State Community
College in Cleveland, Tennessee. He began doctoral studies at the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville early the next year. Presently, Mr. Warren is Director of the
Business and Industry Institute at Cleveland State Community College. He also
teaches management courses at both the community college and as a faculty
member for the University of Phoenix Online.
Mr. Warren resides, with his wife Debbie, in Ooltewah, Tennessee, near
Chattanooga. In addition to his work, he and his wife are active in church,
neighborhood, and social activities and travel frequently.
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